What Work? Quasi-Experiments in Cybersecurity Policy Interventions by Grindal, Karl T.








of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in the
Georgia Institute of Technology
School of Public Policy
Georgia Institute of Technology
August 2021
© Karl Grindal 2021
WHAT WORKS? QUASI-EXPERIMENTS IN CYBERSECURITY POLICY
INTERVENTIONS
Thesis committee:
Dr. Milton Mueller, Advisor
School of Public Policy
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Juan Rogers
School of Public Policy
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Hans Klein
School of Public Policy
Georgia Institute of Technology
Peter Swire
Scheller College of Business
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Sasha Romanosky
RAND Corporation
Date approved: June 2, 2021
Errors using inadequate data are much less than those using no data at all.
Charles Babbage
For my nieces, Eira and Kara, may your parent’s sharing of baby photos be your only loss
of privacy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful to have received throughout this dissertation process excellent academic
guidance and been encouraged by understanding friends and family. First, I would like to
thank my advisor, Professor Milton Mueller; his advice was invaluable in formulating the
research question and focusing my effort. Next, I would like to thank the other members of
my committee for their constructive engagement. I am also grateful for the support of the
Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (STIP) Program and the advising of Dr. Jan
Youtie at the Enterprise Innovation Institute. Their support in the Summer of 2019 allowed
me to get an early start using breach data. As government employees compiled much of
the data I worked with as part of open records requests, I would also like to thank these
unknown bureaucrats. Their work has helped me to knit together a more comprehensive
picture of the breach landscape. I cannot begin to express my thanks to Jason Healey.
Before joining Georgia Tech, Jason served as my mentor and introduction to the field of
cyber conflict; I would not be here without him.
Essential to doctoral studies is a strong cohort. These past five years at Georgia Tech,
I have been fortunate to have close friends and colleagues in my fellow Ph.D. students.
In particular, thanks to Sorawit Siangjaeo, Daniel Sanbeg, Seokkyun Woo, Karim Farhat,
and Daniel Schiff. Thank you to my dog Woodrow whose affection and devotion keep me
sane. Thanks to my brother Erik Grindal and his wife Shannon for their constant support
and love. Thanks to my parents, Michele and Ted Grindal, they prepared me for the world
and have always encouraged me to be my best. A special thanks to my partner, Beena




Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
List of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter 2: Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1 Relevant Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Theoretical Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.1 Economics of information security literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.2 Metaregulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.3 Tacit Theories of Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.4 Regulator and Legislative Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
vi
Chapter 3: Case Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1 The Massachusetts Data Security Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2 HITECH Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.1 FTC Section 5 Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.2 Other FTC Relevant Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3.3 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, et al. . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4 NY Department of Financial Services Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4.1 Other New York Regulatory Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Chapter 4: Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1 Data Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.1.1 Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.1.2 Data Cleaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.2 Methodological Approach for each Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2.1 Case 1: Massachusetts Data Security Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.2.2 Case 2: HITECH Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2.3 Case 3: NY DFS Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2.4 Case 4: FTC Section 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.3 Comparative Interrupted Time-Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4 Other Variables for Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.4.1 Data Breach Letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.4.2 Reports of Identity Theft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
vii
4.4.3 Federal Spending on Cybersecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.4.4 Cyber Vulnerabilities and Hygiene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Chapter 5: Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.2 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.3 Spatial and Temporal Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.3.1 Seasonal Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.3.2 Size of Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.4 NY Department of Financial Services Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.4.1 Comparing New York Finance to Other Industries with Maine Data 71
5.4.2 Comparing New York Finance to Finance Elsewhere with Maine Data 73
5.4.3 Comparing New York Finance to Finance Elsewhere with Con-
necticut Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.4.4 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.5 Massachusetts Data Security Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.5.1 Comparison with New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.5.2 Comparison with North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.6 HITECH Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.6.1 Heath and Non-Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.6.2 Heath and Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.7 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.7.1 FTC Complaint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.7.2 Third Circuit Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
viii
5.8 Statistical Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Chapter 6: Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.1 Impact of Spatial and Temporal Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.2 Comparing Cyber Regulatory Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.2.1 Policy Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.2.2 Contents of Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.2.3 Implementation Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.2.4 Regulatory Penalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.3 Estimating Savings from NY DFS Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.4 Persistence of NY DFS Regulatory Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.5 Integrating Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.6 Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Appendix A: Introduction and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Appendix B: Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Appendix C: Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Appendix D: Availability of Code and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Vita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
ix
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 State Data - Percent of Collection for each Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 Regulatory Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1 Case Selection Categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2 Penalties for Violation of 45 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 160
and 164 Committed after February 18, 2009. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.1 Comparative Design Interrupted Time-Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Captured Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3 Case Analysis and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4 CyberGreen Risk Types by Year. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Captured Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.2 Frequency of Reported Breaches Across Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.3 Comparative ITS NY DFS Regulations (NY Finance Compared to NY Not-
Finance) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.4 Comparative ITS NY DFS Regulations (NY Finance Compared to Non-NY
Finance) with Maine Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.5 Comparative ITS NY DFS Regulations (NY Finance Compared to NY Not-
Finance with Connecticut Data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.6 Comparative ITS NY DFS Regulations (NY Finance Compared to NY Not-
Finance, Connecticut Robustness Check) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
x
5.7 Comparative ITS Massachusetts Data Security Law vs. New Hampshire . . 80
5.8 Comparative ITS Massachusetts Data Security Law vs. North Carolina for
Large Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.9 Comparative ITS HITECH Act (Health Sector Compared to All Other Sec-
tors) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.10 Comparative ITS HITECH Act (Health Sector Compared to All Other Sec-
tors) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.11 Quasi-Experiment for Wyndham FTC Suit (FTC Complaint) . . . . . . . . 89
5.12 Quasi-Experiment for Wyndham FTC Suit (Third Circuit Decision) . . . . . 90
6.1 Organizational Regulatory Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.2 Computer Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.3 First Regulatory Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.4 Probable losses based on records affected in a breach (Cyentia Report) . . . 103
6.5 Modified Loss Table Using Cyentia Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.6 Estimated Cost for Different Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A.1 Security Breach Notification Laws Passed in States by Year . . . . . . . . . 114
B.1 Sample Data Frame Used for Comparative interrupted time series (ITS) . . 117
D.1 Function of code used in dissertation research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Number of States with Data Breach Notification Laws by Year . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Diagram of Factor Relationships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1 Number of Breach Incidents Reported to HHS by Year . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 FTC Data Security Enforcement Cases per Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.1 Data Breach Incidents by Year in Public Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2 Cybersecurity Spending by the Federal Government in Billions of Dollars . 59
5.1 Breaches per Million with no Resident Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.2 Breaches per Million with Resident Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.3 Number of Incidents Reported Across Different States in 2018 . . . . . . . 65
5.4 Sample Decomposition of Additive Time-Series for Massachusetts . . . . . 67
5.5 Seasonal Variation in Breaches per Million . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.6 Histogram of Total Individuals Affected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.7 Comparing New York Finance to New York Not-Finance . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.8 Comparing New York Finance to Not-New York Finance with Maine Data . 74
5.9 Comparing New York Finance to Not-New York Finance with Connecticut
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.10 Comparing New York Finance to Not-New York Finance with Connecticut
Data (First Date of Breach) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
xii
5.11 Comparing Massachusetts and New Hampshire Breaches . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.12 Co-occurrence of Breach Incidents in Massachusetts and New Hampshire . 80
5.13 Comparing Massachusetts and North Carolina Breaches (1000+ residents) . 81
5.14 Co-occurrence of Large Breach Incidents (+1000 residents affected) in MA
and NC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.15 HITECH Act: Health and Non-Health Coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.16 Comparing Health vs. Non-Health Breaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.17 Comparing Health vs. Finance Breaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.18 Frequency of Breaches Across Seven States, Seasonally Adjusted . . . . . . 87
5.19 The Wyndham FTC Complaint as Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.20 The Wyndham FTC Third Circuit Decision as Intervention . . . . . . . . . 89
6.1 Implementation Days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.2 Maximum Penalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.3 Savings from Regulation over 1 Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.4 New York Financial Breach Growth in 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
C.1 Tests on Massachusetts (No Resident Limit) for (a) autocorrelation function
(ACF) (b) partial autocorrelation function (PACF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
C.2 Tests on Massachusetts (1000+ affected) for (a) ACF (b) PACF . . . . . . . 119
C.3 Tests on New Hampshire Incidents for (a) ACF (b) PACF . . . . . . . . . . 120
C.4 Tests on North Carolina (1000+ affected) for (a) ACF (b) PACF . . . . . . . 120
C.5 Tests on Health Related Incidents for (a) ACF (b) PACF . . . . . . . . . . . 121
C.6 Tests on Non-Health Related Incidents for (a) ACF (b) PACF . . . . . . . . 121
xiii
C.7 Tests on Finance Related Incidents as part of HITECH Act for (a) ACF (b)
PACF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
C.8 Tests on All Incidents Across Six States (Used in Wyndham Case - July
2011 to November 2012) for (a) ACF (b) PACF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
C.9 Tests on All Incidents Across Six States (Used in Wyndham Case - Oct
2014 to June 2016) for (a) ACF (b) PACF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
C.10 Tests on Finance Incidents in New York for (a) ACF (b) PACF . . . . . . . 123
C.11 Tests on Finance Incidents Outside of New York for (a) ACF (b) PACF . . . 124




ARIMA autoregressive integrated moving average
ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
ASN Autonomous System Number
CAPs corrective action plans
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team
CFO Chief Financial Officers Act
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CISA Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act
CISO Chief Information Security Officer
CMR Code of Massachusetts Regulations
CMS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
COPPA Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
CRS Congressional Research Service
DBIR Data Breach Investigations Report
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DUNS Data Universal Numbering System
ePHI electronic public health information
FAIR Factor Analysis of Information Risk
FCRA Fair Credit Reporting Act
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
xv
FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act
FOI Freedom of Information
FTC Federal Trade Commission
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
GLBA Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
HHS Health and Human Services
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
HIT health information technology
HITECH Act Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
IAPP International Association of Privacy Professionals
ITS interrupted time series
KPSS Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin
KS Kolmogorov Smirnoff
MDDI Million Dollar Directory
NAICS North American Industry Classification System
NCSL National Conference of State Legislatures
NVD National Vulnerability Database
NY DFS NY Department of Financial Services
NYCRR New York Codes, Rules and Regulations
OCABR Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation
OCR Office of Civil Rights
OMB Office of Management and Budget
ONC Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology
PACF partial autocorrelation function
PCI Payment Card Industry
PCI DSS Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
PHI protected health information
xvi
PII Personally Identifiable Information
RFI request for information
SHIELD Act Stop Hacks and Improve Electronic Data Security Act
SOX Sarbanes–Oxley Act
VERIS Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing
WISP written information security program
xvii
SUMMARY
Given the significance policymakers place on cybersecurity, how effective has a decade of
policy interventions been at reducing social costs? This paper uses the limited regulations
implemented by States and United States government agencies as quasi-experiments. This
work measures regulatory efficacy by compiling mandatory state-level data breach reports
to create novel breach incident data sets. A reduction in breach frequency serves as the kind
of measurable outcome that regulators would intend cybersecurity policy interventions to
address. To this end, I evaluate four cybersecurity regulations: the Massachusetts Data
Security Law, the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
(HITECH Act), Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Section 5 enforcements against Wynd-
ham Hotels, and the NY Department of Financial Services (NY DFS) cybersecurity regu-
lations.
I assessed each regulatory intervention as a quasi-experiment, employing segmented
time-series regressions to evaluate the relative change in reported data breaches. These
quasi-experiments controlled for policy implementation phases and reporting requirements.
As these policies have overlapping aims (creating information security programs), we can
infer whether this meta-regulatory approach, the encouragement of self-regulation by in-
dustry with corresponding civil penalties, has been an effective regulatory strategy. An
effectively regulatory system would sufficiently motivate the targeted population to im-
prove their cyber posture, such that there was a reduction in breach reporting. Ultimately,
three of the cases discussed did not show an impact. However, analysis of the NY DFS
regulations suggests a meaningful decrease of approximately 27 breaches in the following
year.
Comparing these regulations shows differences in scope, content, and penalties that
may explain this disparate level of impact. Next, the efficacy of NY DFS regulations is
1
placed in context with a discussion of potential savings and the duration of the impact.
While demonstrating that cybersecurity regulations can meaningfully reduce breaches, this
work suggests that this effect is neither generalizable across diverse contexts nor a satisfac-
tory solution to the complex and pervasive issues associated with identity theft, fraud, and
cyber crime.
Overall, these findings suggest potential promise in this methodology for the policy
evaluation of data security laws and regulations. Policymakers could improve these assess-
ments by standardizing the reporting of mandatory breach notification data so that policy
efficacy can be better measured. Because of its similarity to the NY DFS regulations, this
finding may also provide preliminary empirical evidence for the Insurance Data Security
Model Law propagated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Drawing
on this methodology, this model legislation and other data security and privacy regulatory
interventions should now be the subject for future research. The first step for policy makers




What works? For decades, United States legislators and regulators have sought to create a
more secure cyberspace. The complexity of this subject area has led the United States to
pursue a strategy of regulatory restraint in the belief that a rapidly evolving private sector
would develop and implement best practices. Yet, within a limited number of states and
nationwide industries, regulators have mandated private sector companies to adopt infor-
mation security programs to protect consumer data. Despite state and federal experimenta-
tion, these interventions have not been subject to policy evaluation. Without assessing the
effectiveness of these interventions, cybersecurity and privacy policies are operating in the
dark.
However, because of its motley regulatory regimes, these US interventions create poten-
tial quasi-experiments. This work applies traditional policy evaluation methods to the novel
domain of cyberspace. The four regulatory interventions selected are the Massachusetts
Data Security Law, the HITECH Act, FTC Section 5 enforcement against Wyndham Ho-
tels, and the NY DFS cybersecurity regulations. All four regulatory regimes share a policy
logic of mandating the adoption of a specified cybersecurity program to protect Personally
Identifiable Information (PII). These cybersecurity regulations share or expand on a man-
date that companies should draft policies, appoint a manager to oversee the policies, and
encrypt consumer data. Regulators enforce these rules with penalties for covered entities
who are negligently or willfully non-compliant.
What metric can characterize the efficacy of these regulations? As mandatory state-
level reporting of breaches precedes these policies’ implementation, it creates a potential
measure of effectiveness. Evaluating the frequency of breaches (often scaled for state popu-
lation size) in the months preceding and following a regulatory intervention and comparing
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this to a control population produces a practical empirical test. So, what works? Ultimately,
this research identifies the NY DFS cybersecurity regulations preventing approximately 27
breaches in the year following enactment. However, as the other three interventions did not
significantly reduce breaches, the effectiveness of regulations can not be generalized.
Given that legislators and regulators prioritize cybersecurity issues, why has policy
evaluation been ignored? This absence was primarily a result of the inadequacy of available
data. Existing sources lacked state and industry variables from which to create control
groups. This study overcame this obstacle, restructuring existing state-reported breach
incident datasets enabling cross-state and cross-industry comparisons.
Figure 1.1: Number of States with Data Breach Notification Laws by Year
















Data breach notification has a unique policy history, creating a mandatory reporting
regime that at least in principle is comprehensive. Starting in 2002, California passed the
nation’s first data breach notification legislation (An Act to Amend, Renumber, and Add
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Section 1798.82 of, and to Add Section 1798.29 to, the Civil Code, Relating to Personal
Information. 2002). This legislation required that companies notify the state residents
whose records were lost. In 2005, California’s legislation was put to the test when the
Georgia-based company, ChoicePoint Inc, notified 35,000 California state residents of a
data breach and voluntarily notified 111,000 customers located outside California (United
States of America v Choicepoint Inc. 2010). This incident led to rapid policy diffusion as
other states adopted similar legislation. Alabama was the last state to implement a data
breach notification law for consumers in 2018 (Hosp and Drum 2018).
While this initial legislation required notification of consumers, many states subse-
quently amended this legislation to expand the notification requirements to include con-
sumer reporting companies and government agencies. With the collection of breach noti-
fication records by state governments, this information was publicly available by 18 states
as of January 2020 (U.S. State Data Breach Lists, 2020). Additional data breach notifica-
tion records have been made available through state-level freedom of information requests.
The following table shows state-based breach notification data availability over time as the
collection percentage during a given year.
Why should we expect policy interventions to reduce breaches? The relationship be-
tween laws/regulations and data breach reporting is not a direct one. There is instead a long
causal chain that links policy interventions to better security to fewer breaches. Neverthe-
less, Governors and regulators would often make this link themselves when enacting these
policies. As Governor Cuomo said of the NY DFS regulations, they should “guarantee the
financial services industry upholds its obligation to protect consumers and ensure that its
systems are sufficiently constructed to prevent cyber-attacks to the fullest extent possible.”
Consistent with this logic, Figure 1.2 shows a causal diagram modeling how data breach
factors may relate. Arrows demonstrate the sequence of expected effects and the accompa-
nying plus or minus signs indicate the expected direction of correlation. This diagram
5
Table 1.1: State Data - Percent of Collection for each Year
State ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13 ’14 ’15 ’16 ’17 ’18 ’19 ’20
North Carolina 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
New Hampshire 53 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 83
Hawaii 47 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 97
Massachusetts 46 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 42
South Carolina 43 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 48
Maine 42 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 30
California 95 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 30
Wisconsin 69 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 28
Connecticut 25 100 100 100 100 100 100 77
Indiana 72 100 100 100 100 100 100 26
Maryland 99 100 100 100 100 08
Montana 65 100 100 100 100 30
Washington 39 100 100 100 100 29
Iowa 28 100 100 100 100
Oregon 17 100 100 100 100 31
Nebraska 100 100
Vermont 87 100 100 30
Delaware 72 81
New Mexico 51 100 75
North Dakota 99
shows measurable variables placed in blue boxes and non-measurable variables shown
in white. While the regulations explored in this paper mandate particular firm behav-
ior, broader global factors (i.e., the internet-connected population, cybersecurity literacy,
new vulnerabilities, cyber hygiene) would also shape company behavior. Consequent to
reducing data breaches, effective legislation would be expected to benefit consumers, as
demonstrated by a reduction in reported identity theft.
This diagram demonstrates some of the presumptions underlying this policy analysis.
One critical assumption is that increased organizational cybersecurity should decrease the
number of data breaches more than it increases the number of breaches discovered. This
supposition is not inconsequential, as an improvement to organizational cybersecurity ma-
turity would reasonably improve threat detection.
Another essential premise is that various global factors would equally affect the treat-
ment and non-treatment populations. Most of the relevant global factor data collected for
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Figure 1.2: Diagram of Factor Relationships.
this research did not match the unit of analysis for state or industrial data used in the quasi-
experiments. To the extent possible, the models used in this research control for global
factors (checking, for example, that breach reporting requirements did not meaningfully
change during the experimental period). While not ideal, these assumptions are necessary
given the availability of historical data to make educated hypotheses.
Control populations could be identified in three of the four cases. For the Massachusetts
Data Security Law, we compared reporting in Massachusetts with New Hampshire and
North Carolina. With the HITECH Act, the health sector was compared with finance and
all other sectors. For the NY DFS regulations, breaches affecting the New York finance
sector were compared with breaches affecting financial firms outside the state of New York.
The FTC Wyndham Hotel suit did not present a viable control. Instead, an interrupted time-
series assesses the effect of two treatments, the initial FTC complaint and the subsequent
Third Circuit District Court’s decision through the settlement. Despite the inferential power
of these quasi-experiments, only the NY DFS regulations showed a statistically significant
measure of efficacy.
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Why should we expect these laws to work? For one, the drafters of these regulations be-
lieved that they could, discussed in subsection 2.3.4. Further, the policy logic embedded in
the regulations creates the prospect for real financial penalties costing companies millions
of dollars. These laws frequently serve as models for future legislative and regulatory ac-
tions. While predating it by almost a decade, the Massachusetts Data Security Law, passed
in 2010, resembles the Stop Hacks and Improve Electronic Data Security (SHIELD) Act
in New York in 2019. The NY DFS regulations have served as a basis for model insurance
legislation advanced by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and passed
by thirteen states as of April 2021. Policy makers should be aware of the context where
these regulatory practices have worked and where they have not. These findings would
allow for the limited time, resources, and agenda setting given to this topic to be focused.
In addition to core findings related to the quasi-experiments, supplementary descriptive
findings related to spatial and temporal factors were also revealing. One finding shows
an approximately 20% increase years-over-year in reported breaches by covered states.
Additionally, preliminary evidence for a seasonal trend with a peak for breach reporting in
the Spring and a drop in the Fall. Evidence also shows that approximately half of breaches
are local in their effect, only reported by affected organizations in one of the covered states.
This document comprises chapters to summarize relevant literature (chapter 2), describe
the selected cases (chapter 3, review the developed methodology (chapter 4), analyze find-
ings (chapter 5), and explore their consequent implications (chapter 6). Given that the NY
DFS finding showed a meaningfully beneficial effect, how did it differ from the other reg-
ulatory interventions? The implications chapter investigates differences in scope, content,
implementation periods, and penalties between the legislation. It also attempts to esti-
mate the monetary savings from the avoided breaches and hypothesizes on why this impact
might not persist beyond the initial year of implementation. Given this context, questions
regarding policy design and future work are addressed. Only then can we move to imagine





Dean (2016) anticipated this research with the article “Natural and Quasi-Natural Experi-
ments in Cybersecurity Policies.” Dean proposed an approximation of the quasi-experimental
methodology used in this study, stating, “[u]sing a difference-in-differences methodology,
one could conduct a quasi-natural experiment to determine the impact of mandatory data
breach notification laws and regulations in the United States” (156). This article went on
to highlight how a researcher might produce both inter-state and inter-firm sub-populations
for comparison.1
Only a few researchers have made attempts to evaluate the efficacy of cybersecurity
policies. Notable examples include Romanosky et al. (2011, 281), who connected data
breach notification laws to a 6.1% reduction in identity theft. Kesari (2020, 18) noted that
updates in 2016 to California data breach notification suggest “.1 fewer reports per 100,000
people” for reported medical identity theft. Liu (2020) found that state anti-phishing or
credit freeze legislation did not impact annual identity theft reports. However, this literature
has been slow to develop, despite governmental action and investments in cybersecurity
remaining a governmental priority (Homan 2021).
While cybersecurity has not yet been the subject of rigorous legislative and regulatory
policy evaluation, significant literature exists around the topic of data breaches. Much of
this work has focused on descriptive efforts to characterize the domain. To ensure that
the subsequent literature review was comprehensive, I created a propositional inventory of
1One specific challenge of Dean’s proposed study is its focus on “notification laws and regulations.” A
difference-in-difference model could not accurately characterize cybersecurity efficacy if data breach report-
ing laws were either newly implemented or modified the requirements around reporting.
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all articles on Scopus that referenced either “cybersecurity policy” or “data breach.” Addi-
tions to the literature review were less systemic, identifying relevant articles using search
terms like “security breach,” “information breach,” “policy evaluation,” and “cybersecu-
rity” within Google Scholar.
Topics of particular interest to the literature include: measuring the size and frequency
of breaches (Wheatley, Maillart, and Sornette 2016; Edwards, Hofmeyr, and Forrest 2016)
and estimating the costs of these incidents either looking at the effect on market value
(Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan 2004), or the cost of lawsuits against breached
companies (Romanosky, Hoffman, and Acquisti 2014), or a model combining both (Ro-
manosky et al. 2017). Given the corporate information associated with these data sets, re-
searchers have also used breach data to predict the risk of breaches (Xu et al. 2018; Sarabi
et al. 2016). Other work has attempted to see how respondents react to public breach dis-
closure by measuring its effect on consumer risk perceptions and behavior (Yixin Zou et al.
2018) or public reports of identity theft (Romanosky, Telang, and Acquisti 2011). As data
breaches have increasingly become an assumed risk by businesses, researchers have started
to tie corporate concerns about breaches to insurance policies. This relationship can provide
insight into business perceptions of this risk by measuring the premiums they are willing
to pay (Franke 2017) or the services and coverage gaps of these policies (Romanosky et al.
2017).
Quantitative findings relevant to the data breach literature have advanced on several
fronts as data collection has improved and researchers have adopted more complex statis-
tical methods. Eling and Wirfs (2019, 1112) identified a skewness in the loss distribution
where “the mean loss (US$ 43.49 million) is higher than the median loss (US$ 1.54 mil-
lion).” Eling and Wirfs (2019) model data breach size with a Pareto distribution (consistent
with Wheatley, Maillart, and Sornette 2016) rather than with a log-normal distribution (Ed-
wards, Hofmeyr, and Forrest 2016). Most critically for this work, Eling and Wirfs’ (2019)
findings suggest an increase in breach frequency but a decrease in extreme losses over time.
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Using the same dataset, Xu (2018, 2856) found a similar result, stating the “threat of cyber
hacks is indeed getting worse in terms of their frequency, but not in terms of the magnitude
of their damage.” One hypothesis for this finding could be that certain larger companies
complying with stricter regulatory regimes are becoming less susceptible to high-impact
incidents. Relevant to the proposed research, an understanding that breach size and cor-
porate losses are non-linear shapes how companies may perceive the risk of regulatory
penalties.
Additional empirical findings related to data breaches measure the relationship be-
tween separate incidents. Xu (2018) recommends stochastic process models over distri-
butions when modeling hacking breaches inter-arrival times and breach size due to issues
with autocorrelation. Eling and Jungs (2018) look at cross-industry correlation and cross-
breach correlation, finding cross-breach (i.e., risk factors) correlate more significantly than
cross-industry. Concerns with autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation informed several
methodological decisions discussed in chapter 4 and chapter 5.
As this work attempts to characterize how incentives shape company behavior, corre-
sponding economistic literature have developed valuable models. To this end, Laube (2016,
38) notes that “a breach notification law with security audits and sanctions can incentivize
firms to report breaches to authorities, regardless of accompanied disclosure costs.” While
subtle, this finding speaks to a particular concern with the proposed research; a stricter
regulatory regime may be increasing reporting behavior. To disaggregate reporting from
reduced breaches, one could test the effects of cybersecurity regulations on identity theft
reporting while controlling for data breaches. However, in all four cases, either the dates of
the interventions did not overlap with the identity theft data collected, or the identity theft
data does not include intra-state industry-level reports. If reporting is overdetermined and
not correlated with sanctions, this research shifts from a focus on corporate reporting to a
measure of breach frequency. Gao (2015, 425) asserts that “security breach probability . . .
decreases with the efficiency of security investment and the related firm’s monetary loss.”
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The incentives of regulatory penalties demonstrate additional potential monetary losses and
would thus be hypothesized to drive cybersecurity investments.
2.2 Data Sources
In the literature described above, the researchers drew on pre-existing breach datasets.
While this allowed these researchers to avoid working with primary source documents,
secondary sources restrict what questions researchers can address using the available data.
• Database 1 Advisen’s Cyber Loss Data
• Database 2 DataLossDB.org
• Database 3 Hackmageddon
• Database 4 HHS Breach Portal
• Database 5 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
• Database 6 SAS® OpRisk Global Data
• Database 7 VERIS Community Database (VCDB)
• Database 8 Identity Theft Resource Center
Perhaps the most frequently employed source for data breach research has been the
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (Database 5). Because of its rich coverage and accessibility,
Clearinghouse appeared to be the most popular platform for database research. Conse-
quently, Eling and Jung (2018), Xu et al. (2018), Edwards et al. (2016), and Wheatley et
al. (2016) all used this data source. At some point, Clearinghouse populated their dataset
with records from the datalossdb.org project (Database 2). Database 2 is no longer being
maintained but was used by researchers before the site owners shut it down. Romanosky
(2014) used this data set to investigate the likelihood of lawsuits and settlements, finding
that the “odds of a settlement are found to be ten times greater when the breach is caused
by a cyber attack.” Romanosky (76) also found that lawsuits were 3.5 times more likely
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when victims incurred financial losses and six times less likely when the breached entity
provided free credit monitoring.
The Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS) Community Database
(Database 7) provides a GitHub-based information-sharing resource that feeds into the
annual Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR). This data is compiled from
information-sharing partners and provides extensive incident metadata; however, it appears
to anonymize the names of the affected organizations. Because of its rich organizational
and technical level metadata, VERIS has been used to predict the likelihood of a breach
based on enterprise characteristics by Sarabi (2016) and Liu et al. (2015). The site hack-
mageddon.com (Database 3) is a comprehensive private sector data source that its creator
Paolo Passeri has updated since 2014. Rarely used exclusively, Liu et al. (2015) and Fielder
et al. (2014) combined hackmageddon.com data with Verizon data.
Health and Human Services (HHS) (Database 4) has mandated data breach reporting
since 2009 for incidents affecting 500 or more individuals. Liu et al. (2015) attempted to
fit a linear growth curve to incident frequency but did not find statistical significance but
found confidence intervals on a range of additional factors. Bai et al. (2017) used HHS data
to find a statistically significant relationship between the risk of data breaches and hospital
size and status as a major teaching hospital. Related research findings of mine prepared
for the Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (STIP) Program at Georgia Tech before
this dissertation work matched state data to Compustat records for publicly listed firms and
produced similar positive statistical correlations with firm size.
Increasingly, private sector firms have sought to develop incident datasets using propri-
etary monitoring strategies and Freedom of Information (FOI) requests (that proceed my
own). While researchers have employed these data sources with large incident counts, they
appear to be one-off arrangements. Example uses of this kind of data include the work
by Eling and Wirfs (2019), which relied on SAS® OpRisk Global Data (Database 6), and
Romanosky (2016), which used data from Advisen Ltd (Database 1). Romanosky’s work
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demonstrated an interesting sectoral finding that companies in the information and retail
industry experience the highest losses from a data breach and identify the average data
breach as costing firms less than 200k.
2.3 Theoretical Framing
Organizational cybersecurity practices cannot be understood without being placed in the
context of the economic incentives of information system operators. Literature on the eco-
nomics of information security explains how concepts drawn from economics shape these
operator incentives, expounding on concepts such as asymmetric information, externali-
ties, and collective action problems. The following section explores prior work into the
economics of information security literature to place the breach-specific literature in con-
text and articulates the tacit theories of change held by legislators and regulators.
2.3.1 Economics of information security literature
The economics of information security literature builds on a broad economics literature
that explores how incentives shape communications technologies developed in the 1990s
and 2000s. This earlier literature covered a wide range of topics, including platform mar-
kets (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005), social production (Benkler 2002), digital convergence
(Mueller 1999), and spectrum markets (Hazlett 1990). Not until communications tech-
nologies became ubiquitous and hacking incidents started to cause economic damages
did the confidentiality and accessibility of data become an issue of significant concern
to economists. Information security literature began in earnest in the mid-2000s as an
extension of this analysis, exploring how economic factors and incentives shape the cyber-
security practices of the private sector.
Early research by Anderson and Moore (2006) identified a range of economic factors
as playing a role in the economics of information security. This research identified mis-
aligned incentives in the design and deployment of computer systems, noted the impact of
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externalities, described the market for software as “a market for lemons,” and foresaw the
potential for insurance markets to distribute risk for low probability cyber events. Bauer
and van Eaten (2009) go beyond merely summarizing potential economic issues shaping
cyber behavior and propose a system where decentralized decisions create emergent pat-
terns that reflect a mix of positive and negative externalities. They also suggest that to
correct these misaligned incentives for diffused stakeholders, “[e]nhancing cybersecurity
at a broader level will have to overcome this coordination and cooperation issue: it is a
collective action problem” (Bauer and van Eeten 2009, 715). These collective action chal-
lenges are significant because of inter-dependency. Kunreuther and Heal (2003) explored
the application of interdependent security, drawing on contagion models. They found that
an “institution’s vulnerability depends not only on how it manages its risks but also on how
other unrelated entities manage their risks” (232).
While initial work often characterized potential challenges with measuring hacking-
related losses, later work would try to start and address these limitations. In particular,
numerous efforts have sought to identify the costs associated with cybercrime. Anderson
et al. (2013) proposed a framework that decomposed the costs of cybercrimes into three
categories: direct costs, indirect losses, and defense costs. While the affected party ex-
periences direct losses, indirect losses produce social costs like decreased trust in online
services; defense cost measures the totality of security products, services, and public pol-
icy instruments used to prevent successful attacks. A thesis by Lenchik (2016) simulated
another form of problem evolution. Even as cybersecurity measures may reduce the risk
of identity theft to an online banking platform, the subsequent growth in the platform may
make it a more attractive target for identity theft in the future. One particular challenge
to achieving secure systems is the ability of hackers to adapt to changes in organizational
defenses such that “tightened security may eventually lead to even more malicious forms
of intrusion” (Asghari, van Eeten, and Bauer 2016, 281).
On the solution side, a Brookings Institute presentation by Allan Friedman (2012, 26)
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highlighted a Regulatory Spectrum (see Table 2.1) of potential action at a talk on The
Economics of Cybersecurity. This document distinguished between the following:









The proposed policies explored in the subsequent case studies operate across this con-
tinuum, adopting voluntary and mandated regulations. They serve to:
1. Mandate some standards (i.e., encryption of customer data)
2. Promote the adoption of open-ended policies without specifying their substance
3. While not establishing liability, these regulations open the door to civil lawsuits when
the affected entity inadequately adopts government-recognized standards and best
practices.
2.3.2 Metaregulation
Meta-Regulation is an ideal term to characterize the US-based cybersecurity regulatory
framework, applicable across the four cases explored in this work. The concept can be
defined as “those ways that outside regulators seek to induce regulated entities to develop
their own self-regulatory response” (Coglianese and Mendelson 2012) or the “process in
which the regulatory authority oversees a control or risk management system, rather than
carries out regulation directly - it ‘steers, rather than rows’” (Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge
2012, 147). Its theoreticians contrast Meta-Regulation with the concept of ’Command and
control’ regulation, “which refers to the prescriptive nature of the regulation (the command)
supported by the imposition of some negative action by the regulator (the control)” (Simon
2016, 1). “If adequately enforced, command and control regulation is dependable; it can
specify operational parameters and regulatory obligations with clarity and immediacy” (1).
16
‘Meta-regulation’ has been used to describe regulation for self-regulation in
different ways. At its most basic, it relates to corporate self-audits and safety
cases where businesses develop their own rules and reporting for the regulator
to assess.
-F.C. Simon, (2016, 2)
2.3.3 Tacit Theories of Change
Legislators and regulators implement policies based on implicit assumptions that take the
form of shared theories of change. These theories of change fit within the framework
of the economic security literature discussed above, even while it is highly doubtful that
legislators would have read this literature. Having identified the need to create public policy
to address a problem, legislators and regulators identify stakeholders, perceived wrongs,
and propose remedies. In the breach space, legislators are frequently concerned about
the impact on residents, while regulators are concerned about the effect on consumers.
As legislators and regulators perceive resident/customer security as a positive externality,
governments seek to create incentives that shift responsibility for security onto the affected
company.
A form of epistemic humility constrains this desire to create incentives for companies
to adopt security measures. Governments may justify their restrained action with the be-
lief that “technological innovation outpaces the ability of laws and regulations to keep up”
(Therier 2018). Legislators, perceiving the private sector as better equipped to describe
these evolving best practices, place the private sector in a position of information asymme-
try where corporations are well-positioned to operate as independent agents. Based on the
Ambiguity/Conflict Matrix developed by Richard E. Matland (1995), cybersecurity policy
can be defined as experimental implementation, low on conflict and high on ambiguity, a
domain with general uncertainty in goals, technology, and tactics with a shared core value.
Legislators integrate this ambiguity by creating broad technology-neutral regulations that
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enable the private sector to develop standards and practices more organically.
Across all four cases, regulators embed tacit theories of change in one form or another;
however, the degree of restraint and epistemic humility has evolved over time and at differ-
ent levels of authority. Consequently, the Massachusetts Data Security Law passed in 2007
is more constrained than the NY DFS regulations passed a decade later in 2017. In addition
to growing confidence in best practices, the NY DFS regulations apply to a subset of the
New York Financial sector that is advanced in its capability and a relatively homogeneous
population, making it easier to govern.
2.3.4 Regulator and Legislative Intent
Beyond tacit theories of change, I review the explicit language used by legislators and
regulators preceding the four cases. We can infer the particular intentions that characterized
the cyber policy interventions within their historical context. Still, the passage with which
a bill or regulation becomes adopted is not always orderly, and rarely is a singular argument
put forward.
Before exploring the four cases, it is illuminating to look at the justification for Califor-
nia’s original data breach notification regulation in 2002. Former California State Senator
Joseph Simitian (2009), who drafted the legislation as part of Assembly Bill 700, charac-
terized this process in an academic journal. Senator Simitian described how the idea for
notification came two days before the legislative deadline during a small conference call.
Senator Simitian had organized the call to discuss a privacy bill he was drafting. Deidre
Mulligan, a lawyer with the University of California Berkeley Samuelson Clinic, proposed
the idea during this call. Sen Simitian claims to have also considered notification but had
previously dropped the proposal from the draft under discussion. This concurrent ideation
gave him the courage to adopt the provision in the draft legislation. The bill’s ultimate
passage was a product of complex negotiations and instigated in part by the 2002 Teale
Data Center breach, which included state employee information, including California leg-
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islators. When discussing the reasoning behind data breach notification, Senator Simitian
emphasized consumer notification empowering individuals to make informed judgments
about how to secure themselves. However, Senator Simitian also “hoped to provide an in-
centive to those responsible for public and private databases to improve their security (and
thus reduce the risk for all of us).” (Simitian 2009, 1015)
The 2007 TJ Maxx data breach incident is partially responsible for instigating the Mas-
sachusetts Data Security Act. Representative Castillo, who drafted the initial legislation,
linked the legislation to the national incident in interviews in the preceding months, saying,
“Folks like TJX, which are multi-million dollar companies, should be seriously investing
in secure systems.”(Arnold and Costello 2007) However, preventing breaches was not the
only purpose of the legislation. Understanding the purpose behind the law requires sep-
arating the security regulations and the breach notification requirement. In the case of
breach notification, the intention was “to help Massachusetts consumers protect personal
information, fight fraud” (Massachusetts Office of the Governor 2007, 181). In part, this
emphasized, like with the California legislation, consumer’s ability to take steps to protect
themselves. In contrast, OCABR was tasked to “set regulations for how businesses and
government agencies must protect consumers’ information to prevent data breaches.” The
objective of the regulation itself is to “protect against unauthorized access to or use of such
information that may result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any consumer.” (Office
of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation 2017)
In a transcript of Governor Deval Patrick’s comments on August 2, 2007, the day he
signed the legislation, he starts by describing the problem of identity theft and projects
growing and more destructive cyber criminal behavior. He contrasts this with his and the
legislators’ efforts to enact “critical new safeguards to help you protect your credit and your
good name.” (Governor Deval Patrick, 2021) He continues, “It all begins with prevention.
The new identity theft law sets clear standards requiring businesses and other organizations
to protect your valuable personal information” (2). This statement explicitly links data
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protection with identity theft.
Insights into the origin of the HITECH Act come from Representative Peter Stark, who
drafted a commentary in the American Journal of Managed Care describing the process
for the HITECH Acts passage (Stark 2011). Representative Stark had drafted HR 6898
- Health-e Information Technology Act was ultimately integrated by Congress with HR
6357 - Protecting Records, Optimizing Treatment, and Easing Communication through
Healthcare Technology Act (Dingell 2008) and S.1693 - Wired for Health Care Quality
Act (Kennedy 2007). Ultimately they were integrated into the HITECH Act under the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The core focus of these earlier bills
was to increase the adoption of health information technology with incentives. Privacy and
security issues were seen as a core component of these incentives to increase provider and
consumer confidence in new technologies.
Two weeks before Representative Obey introduced the ARRA in the House, the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions held a hearing called “Investing in
Health IT: A Stimulus for A Healthier America” (Kennedy et al. 2009). The event included
speakers from Kaiser Permanente, the Healthcare Leadership Council, and the Government
Accountability Office that spoke to the privacy issues central to this expansion in Health
IT. Their words describe the justification for congressional action:
• “We believe that HIPAA should remain the basis of new privacy rules. However,
privacy policy also must cover personal health data consistently, regardless of what
entity holds the records. Privacy requirements can achieve better protection for con-
sumers without adding to the cost of HIT, changing the practice of medicine, or
creating medical liability issues. There are good models in State law for guarding
against security breaches [...] In our experience, California law provides a model for
breach notification that is clear and consistent across all types of entities, events, and
circumstances.” - Kaiser Permanente (10)
• “We recognize that, as we move towards widespread use of HIT, some aspects of
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the HIPAA Privacy Rule will need to be updated to meet these emerging privacy
and security concerns. For example, meaningful notification of privacy or security
breaches is an important improvement necessary to protect individuals whose identi-
fiable health information has been compromised.” - Mary Grealy, President, Health-
care Leadership Council (Kennedy et al. 2009, 29)
• “As the use of electronic health information exchange increases, so does the need
to protect personal health information from inappropriate disclosure. The capacity
of health information exchange organizations to store and manage a large amount of
electronic health information increases the risk that a breach in security could expose
the personal health information of numerous individuals. Addressing and mitigating
this risk is essential to encourage public acceptance of the increased use of health IT
and electronic medical records.” - Statement of Valerie Melvin, Director, Information
Technology, The Government Accountability Office (37)
These words were echoed with appreciation by members of congress and explicitly tied
to the pending Recovery Act legislation, with Senator Mikulski stating, “ I want to work
with our President and really then move health IT in the stimulus.” (45) Senator Enzi while
more skeptical, said the following “Greater adoption of health IT also presents an opportu-
nity to increase the privacy and security of patient records [...] In some of these instances
it may be necessary to take a fresh look at the current privacy and security rules, but I
urge my colleagues to proceed with caution.” (55) Ultimately, HR 6357 included language
on breach notification and expanded HIPPA to covered entities. A notable difference be-
tween this prior legislation and the HITECH Act was the substitution of “unencrypted” for
“unsecured” protected health information.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) stated that the “HITECH Act is intended
to promote the widespread adoption of health information technology (HIT) to support the
electronic sharing of clinical data among hospitals, physicians, and other health care stake-
holders” (Redhead 2009, 1). CRS continued, “the legislation strengthens enforcement of
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the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy rule and creates
a right to be notified in the event of a breach of identifiable health information” (Redhead
2009, 2). In a statement on Privacy and Security by HHS and OCR, they identified more
narrowly the intentionality behind the privacy and security regulatory actions associated
with the HITECH Act, claiming they would “strengthen the privacy and security of health
information” and that this was an “integral piece of the Administration’s efforts to broaden
the use of health information technology.” (Blumenthal and Verdugo, 2021, 1) Concerning
the notification provision, the statement identified this rule “as an incentive to the health
care industry to improve privacy and security.” (1)
Before the passage of the NY DFS cybersecurity regulations, the department imple-
mented a series of three studies on the banking and insurance sectors and third-party service
providers. These three studies intended to take a “holistic view” of the problem and inform
“flexible” policies where examiners could work with companies to implement solutions.
The studies identified “[b]olstering cyber security” as “a high priority for the Department”
(Report on Cyber Security in the Insurance Sector 2015, 14) and sought to “foster smarter,
stronger cyber security programs” (Report on Cyber Security in the Banking Sector 2014,
12).
Upon the initial pronouncement of the regulations, Governor Cuomo explicitly stated
that these regulations should “guarantee the financial services industry upholds its obliga-
tion to protect consumers and ensure that its systems are sufficiently constructed to prevent
cyber-attacks to the fullest extent possible.” (Press Release 2016) Superintendent Maria
Vullo was somewhat more circumspect, stating that “Consumers must be confident that
their sensitive nonpublic information is being protected and handled appropriately” and
that the effect of regulations on covered entities would “work to reduce vulnerabilities in
their existing cybersecurity programs” (2016).
Themes from the NY DFS regulations consequently touch on the three themes of
consumer confidence, improving organizations’ cyber posture, and consumer protection
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through reduced breaches. The theory of change proposed by the regulation is to “establish
and maintain a cybersecurity program designed to protect consumers’ private data” (Press
Release 2017).
Overall, evaluating the original intentions behind these regulations shows underlying
themes. These themes include 1) a focus on consumer confidence or trust, 2) a focus on
improving the cybersecurity of regulated organizations, and 3) link the regulations with
consumer privacy protections. A separate justification is used for breach disclosure, which
empowers the public to respond to a data breach. This research work focuses on this third
theme, the assumption that new regulations would reduce data breaches. However, the
mechanism this paper assumes will reduce breaches is the improved cyber maturity of
regulated organizations. This more ambitious aim, not just to change corporate practice, but
also to protect consumer privacy was echoed by both Governors Deval Patrick and Andrew
Cuomo. Regulators appeared to be somewhat more circumspect and less ambitious in their
hope for the policies.
2.4 Summary
While breaches have served as a subject of inquiry in the cybersecurity empirical litera-
ture, their use in cybersecurity policy evaluation has been under-explored. This chapter
has identified how several data limitations resulted in this data source being overlooked,2
and general dearth of empirical policy literature in the cybersecurity domain. Theoretical
progress has been made in the economics literature, which has sought to model incentives
and externalities related to cybersecurity resource allocation. US legislators and regula-
tors have tacitly understood these findings. However, they have generally been hesitant to
implement cyber security regulations. In the few cases explored in this research work, regu-
lators opted to enact metaregulatory policies, which promote self-regulation. Chapter 7 will
test the efficacy of these policies as measured by a reduction in data breaches. We may as-
2Methods to overcome these challenges will be shown in subsection 4.1.2.
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sume this serves as an adequate measure of success because legislators and regulators have
expressed as much, and the economics literature brings attention to an under-investment
in cybersecurity that the incentives in these regulations could overcome. The policies ex-
plored in this work are varied in their targeted population and effect. The next chapter will




The interventions explored in this research are the 2009 HITECH Act, the 2010 Mas-
sachusetts Data Security Standard, FTC Section 5 enforcement against Wyndham Hotels in
2012, and the NY DFS cybersecurity regulations passed in 2017. I selected these four cases
because they shared a policy logic that contrasts with a traditional laissez-faire approach
pursued across the United States. In all four cases, regulators sought to shape company in-
centives through regulatory requirements backed with sanctions for non-compliance. This
multiple case study design focused on a shared policy logic that allows for a discussion of
the more generalized finding, do cyber regulatory policy interventions work?
Concerning my case selection, many promising cases lacked an embedded measure of
success. Congress enacted three of the nation’s most significant cybersecurity laws before
states started collecting data breach reports, including the 1996 HIPAA, the 1999 Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, and the 2002 Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA).
Alternative policy actions, including the 2015 U.S.-China Cybercrime and Related Issues
High Level Joint Dialogue and Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), were also
considered and ultimately rejected as neither changed the national regulatory environment
applicable to US corporations.
A crucial dimension of case selection was seeking to identify quasi-experimental inter-
ventions with an identifiable control group. Without a control group, past efforts at policy
evaluation have been subject to criticisms that variability in external factors could easily
explain variations in pre and post-intervention effects (this relationship is explored in Fig-
ure 1.2).
To avoid this issue with internal validity, three of the four cases identify a comparable
state or industry that did not experience the intervention. Consequently, these regulations
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are mapped in Table 3.1 onto a 2x2 targeting a sub-population based on state or industry.
Table 3.1: Case Selection Categories.
State-Level National-Level
Industry Level NY DFS cybersecurity regu-
lation (March 1, 2017)




All Industries Massachusetts Data Security
Standard - 201 C.M.R. 17
(March 1, 2010)
FTC Section 5: Unfair or De-
ceptive Acts or Practices (En-
forcement 2005-2020)
What follows is an in-depth overview of the four policies, including early enforcement
actions related to the regulation, relevant context, and administrative efforts at policy eval-
uation. While this chapter discusses these cases independently, chapter 6 compares the
cases’ regulatory content, implementation periods, and penalties.
3.1 The Massachusetts Data Security Law
The Massachusetts Data Security Standard applies to “persons who own or license personal
information about a resident of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts” (201 CMR 17.00:
Standards for the Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the Commonwealth,
2020, 1). The Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation (OCABR) finalized
the policy on September 22, 2008. The initial regulations would have required compli-
ance on January 1, 2009; however, OCABR pushed back the enforcement date on three
separate occasions, with enforcement formally starting on March 1, 2010. The legislatures
passed this regulatory initiative as Title XV, Chapter 93 H, Section 2 of the Massachusetts
Law. Wherein it instructed “[t]he department of consumer affairs and business regulation
to adopt regulations ... to safeguard the personal information of residents” (Regulations
to Safeguard Personal Information of Commonwealth Residents, 2020). The legislature
adopted this language as An Act Relative to Security Freezes and Notification of Data
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Breaches (2007), after which Governor Deval Patrick signed it on August 2, 2007 (Judy,
Towle, and Mahoney 2007).
Chapter 93 H, Section 3(a) of the Act required that affected organizations “shall provide
notice ... to the attorney general, the director of consumer affairs and business regulation
and to such resident” (An Act Relative to Security Freezes and Notification of Data Breaches
2007). Massachusetts was the fourth state to adopt this requirement, following North Car-
olina in 2005 and New Hampshire and Hawaii in 2006. Consequently, Hewlett Packard
Company was the first reported breach to OCABR on August 16, 2007 (Data Breach No-
tification Report, 2007 2019). As the reporting requirement proceeded the enactment of
new cybersecurity regulations, OCABR reviewed notification letters for approximately 300
breaches. This review informed the drafting of the Massachusetts Data Security Standard
(The New Massachusetts Mandatory Security Regulations and Guidelines 2008).
Both OCABR and the Attorney General receive copies of template letters from affected
breaches. These differ from breach reports to the public as they need not entail the nature
of the breach. Public data posted by the Attorney General identifies whether the incident
involved the loss of electronic or paper records and which incidents involve lost equipment.
Requests for specific notification letters are likely common, as the web page where they
post data breach statistics and meta-data on reports contains language indicating that one
“can request a copy of the notification via a public records request” (Massachusetts Data
Breach Notification Report, 2020).
The regulatory requirements of 201 Code of Massachusetts Regulations (CMR) 17
mandate that covered organizations create a written information security program (WISP).
They must further assign an employee to oversee this program, punish employees who
violate the program, monitor access, encrypt personal information, and train employees.
However, the phrase “to the extent technically feasible” limits many of the specific techni-
cal requirements (201 CMR 17.00: Standards for the Protection of Personal Information of
Residents of the Commonwealth, 2020).
27
Consistent with Massachusetts Law, OCABR had to produce a small business impact
statement (OCABR 2009). An OCABR memo (The New Massachusetts Mandatory Secu-
rity Regulations and Guidelines 2008) provides a fiscal statement wherein it imagines a hy-
pothetical 10-employee business that requires three laptops and a network server supporting
seven desktops. They further assume that the company has a computer consultant available.
Under these assumptions, they hypothesize an upfront cost of $3000 and a monthly cost of
no more than $500 per month. The bulk of these costs are assumed to be associated with
the encryption compliance requirement, which they project would be $2000 for two days
of consultant assistance at $125 per hour. Given that a company already maintains this
computer assistance, OCABR assumes a negligible cost for compliance.
Massachusetts General Law Title XV: Regulation of Trade, chapter 93A, section 4
(,2020) establishes limits on the penalties OCABR might assign for non-compliance. These
are set at $5000 per violation and would be required to pay the investigation and litigation
costs. These penalties do not take the place of a civil action, so the public is still free to file
a separate suit for negligence.
OCABR quickly leveraged these new authorities settling with the Briar Group, a Boston-
based restaurant group, for $110,000 on March 28, 2011. The complaint related to a breach
in April 2009 instigated by hackers installing “malcode” on the Briar Group’s system,
which they failed to remove until December 2009. This complaint alleged that Briar Group
employed:
“default usernames and passwords on its point-of-sale computer system; al-
lowed multiple employees to share commons usernames and passwords; failed
to properly secure its remote access utilities and wireless network; and contin-
ued to accept credit and debit cards from consumers after Briar knew of the
data breach” Massachusetts Attorney General (2011).
In this press release, Attorney General Martha Coakley committed to “continue to take
action against companies that fail to implement basic security measures” (2011).
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This act remained the law of the land in Massachusetts from 2007 through January
10, 2019, when Governor Baker signed HB 4806, An Act Relative to Consumer Protection
from Security Breaches (2018). This law notably expands on reporting requirements in Sec-
tion 8; however, it primarily focuses on consumers’ rights concerning Consumer Reporting
Agencies. A search for “data breach” and “data breaches” on the Massachusetts Legisla-
ture’s website failed to identify any additional amending legislation (Search Results for:
Data Breach, 2020). Further, the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) tracks
Security Breach Notification Legislation, and no new laws were recorded from 2010-2017
(see Table A.1). The only addition identified by NCSL law passed in 2018 was H.B. 5094
related to consumer credit freezes (2018 Security Breach Legislation 2019).
3.2 HITECH Act
Congress passed the HITECH Act on February 17, 2009, as part of the ARRA. While it pri-
marily allocated billions of dollars to encourage the adoption of electronic medical records,
the HITECH Act also contained several provisions intended to improve data security in the
health sector (45 CFR Parts 160 and 164). On April 27, 2009, the HHS posted a request for
information (RFI) for Section 13402 of the HITECH Act (HITECH Act Breach Notifica-
tion Guidance and Request for Public Comment 2009). Promulgated by HHS, regulatory
guidance was devised as “a joint effort by the Office of Civil Rights (OCR), the Office of
the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC), and the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)” (2009). These rules were released as interim final
regulations applicable to breaches 30 days after posting, which CMS did not revise after
receiving public comment.
The HITECH Act amendments to 45 CFR Parts 160 and 164 required the collection
of breach data when health records for 500 or more individuals were affected,1 and man-
date that protected health information (PHI) would be “rendered unusable, unreadable, or
1500 affected individuals is also the cut off for mandatory breach notification in California, Washington,
Iowa, and Delaware.
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indecipherable to unauthorized individuals” (HITECH Act Breach Notification Guidance
and Request for Public Comment 2009). The latter provision was interpreted in the regula-
tions to require encryption both at rest and in motion consistent with Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) 140–2. Notably, with § 164.314, the HITECH Act also ex-
tended Security Rule regulations to business associates of covered health care entities.2 The
HIPPA Security Rule was previously finalized on February 20, 2003, and required covered
entities to comply by April 20, 2005 (Federal Register 2003, 8380). The Security Rule
included administrative, physical, and technical safeguards that established an advanced
security standard across the health care industry.
Since the passage of HIPAA, HHS has received complaints about potential violations.
From April 20, 2005, through December 31, 2010, HHS reported receiving 803 complaints
alleging violations of the Security Rule. These violations are dwarfed by the 57,375 com-
plaints alleging violations of the Privacy Rule from 2003 to 2010. Unfortunately, com-
plaints directed at violations of the HIPAA Security Rule were only categorized separately
until 2010. Further, even before 2010, HHS only ever released aggregate information about
these complaints, making it exceedingly difficult to measure policy efficacy based on com-
plaint data.
However, breach incidents remain a compelling measurement of efficacy. The HITECH
Act produced a national database of healthcare breach incidents. The first incident in the
dataset was posted on October 21, 2009, by Brooke Army Medical Center. Bai et al.
(2017) used this dataset to compare breached Hospitals with those not breached, and Liu
et al. (2015) looked at predictive factors. As shown in Figure 3.1, the growth of incidents
reported to HHS showed a relatively slow trajectory of incidents through 2018, followed
by a relatively rapid increase in reporting more recently in 2019 and 2020.
This trend is of potential interest for future researchers seeking to understand the dis-
2The symbol “§” corresponds to the “section symbol” and helps with referencing the corresponding sec-
tion of a document divided into sections. Consequently, “§ 160.404” refers to Section 314 of Part 164 of Title
45 in the Code of Federal Regulations.
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Figure 3.1: Number of Breach Incidents Reported to HHS by Year



















tribution of incidents nationally. However, it would require inferring broader population
trends based on the health sector. As this state data has not previously been disaggregated,
national population-based estimates have not been possible. Consequently, this data source
could provide a rough approximation of the amount of breach activity in those states who
do not collect breach data.
“§ 160.404 - Amount of a civil money penalty” defines both maximum and minimum
amounts per violation depending on the date of commission, negligence, and correction.
If a subsequent identical violation occurs within the calendar year, the regulation caps
penalties at 1.5 million dollars per violation. § 160.408 further specifies what factors are
considered when assessing a penalty.
Since the implementation of the regulations, additional information about the efficacy
of the rules can be accessed through mandatory HIPAA Audits. The first of which was pi-
loted and completed in December 2012. These audits were focused on the HIPAA Privacy,
Security, and Breach Notification Rules. As part of the audit, HHS selects a limited number
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Table 3.2: Penalties for Violation of 45 CFR Parts 160 and 164 Committed after February
18, 2009.
Provision Condition Corrected Per violation penalty
§ 160.40(2)i $100 to $50,000
per violation
§ 160.40(2)ii Reasonable cause $1,000 to $50,000
per violation
§ 160.40(2)iii Willful neglect Corrected within 30-day $10,000 to $50,000
per violation
§ 160.40(2)iv Willful neglect Corrected within 30-day Less than $50,000
per violation
of covered entities for evaluation. However, the pilot exempted these selected organizations
from enforcement action based on findings discovered through the audit. OCR contracted
out to Booze Allen Hamilton to identify the covered entities and KPMG to design and
conduct the audit protocol (Sanches, 2021). Ultimately, the 2012 audit surveying 115 cov-
ered companies. Two-thirds of the covered entities lacked a comprehensive security risk
assessment (Sanches and Rinker 2013), 27% of entities in non-compliance reported: “they
were unaware of the requirement” (Annual Report to Congress on Breaches of Unsecured
Protected Health Information: For Calendar Years 2011 and 2012 2015, 25). Ultimately,
OCR engaged Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC) to evaluate the audit program (Annual Re-
port to Congress on HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Rule Compliance,
2021, 23). OCR repeated the audit in 2016.
As for enforcement, OCR investigated 458 breach incidents that affected more than
500 individuals between the years 2011-2012. These resolutions agreements represented
the first enforcement actions by OCR after investigating data breaches, with several of
the incidents dating to 2009. Of these 458 investigations, OCR entered into resolution
agreements with seven covered entities:
• Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee ($1,500,000)
• Alaska Department of Health and Social Services ($1,700,000)
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• Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary and Massachusetts Eye and Ear Associates Inc
($1,500,000)
• Hospice of North Idaho ($50,000)
• Idaho State University ($400,000)
• WellPoint Inc ($1.7 million)
• Affinity Health Plan Inc ($1,215,780)
In addition to the settlement payments, shown above in parenthesis, firms also con-
sented to corrective action plans (CAPs) that entail additional Privacy Rule and Security
Rule compliance and training (Annual Report to Congress on Breaches of Unsecured Pro-
tected Health Information: For Calendar Years 2011 and 2012 2015, 20). Four of the seven
resolution agreements related to the theft of physical devices, while Idaho State Univer-
sity and WellPoint experienced unauthorized access of electronic public health information
(ePHI) over the Internet. OCR included additional information about these early enforce-
ment actions in their Annual Report to Congress on HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Breach
Notification Rule Compliance, 12-18.
3.3 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Enforcement
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is an independent agency created in 1914 whose
mission covers consumer protection and civil antitrust law. A five-member bipartisan com-
mission oversees the FTC. Commissioners serve up to seven-year terms and are nominated
by the president and confirmed by the Senate (FTC.gov 2021). While the FTC is not the
only Federal Agency with regulatory authority related to data breaches, it has been the
most active. In the past two decades, the FCC has made 84 enforcement actions related to
“Data Security” (Cases Tagged with Data Security, 2020). Figure 3.2 shows the frequency
of these data security actions since 2000. While cases grew in frequency from 2000-2010,
they have seemingly plateaued since.
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Figure 3.2: FTC Data Security Enforcement Cases per Year
















FTC authority has extended to other areas of privacy and security beyond data secu-
rity. This authority includes rules related to the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA), financial regulations (including the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)), and misrepresentations of compliance with Privacy
Shield or the US-European Union Safe Harbor (Section 5(a), deceptive acts or practices).
As they relate to consumers, data breaches are addressed within the FTC by the Bureau of
Consumer Protection.
3.3.1 FTC Section 5 Authorities
The FTC has used its Section 5 authorities against unfair or deceptive trade practices to push
companies into adopting cybersecurity measures. One of the first such incidents involving
an FTC complaint regarding online privacy was against Eli Lilly in 2002. In this instance,
the company, which primarily served as an online pharmacy selling Prozac, sent an email
to 669 subscribers with their contact information in the ’To’ portion of the email. As Eli
Lilly claimed to uphold a “privacy code” that did not represent internal practices, they
were accused of misrepresentation (United States of America Federal Trade Commission
In the Matter of ELI LILLY and COMPANY, a Corporation. COMPLAINT, 2020). While
this breach was inadvertent, it set a precedent as the first enforcement of data security
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standards. Eli Lilly agreed to create a security program through a consent agreement. This
first agreement carried no penalty; however, violations of the consent agreement would
entail a civil liability of $11,000 per violation (United States of America Federal Trade
Commission In the Matter of ELI LILLY and COMPANY, a Corporation. COMPLAINT,
2020).
The FTC would subsequently employ consent decrees and enforce penalties for inade-
quate cybersecurity. For ten years, the FTC’s authority in this space went unchallenged as
companies settled rather than face costly legal battles. However, in 2012 this changed when
the FTC filed a complaint against Wyndham Worldwide, a hotel chain, the first of two crit-
ical court challenges on the FTC’s authority. The decision in Federal Trade Commission v.
Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, et al. culminated in a settlement in the District Court
of New Jersey. The settlement voided the FTC’s penalties but retained a consent decree to
adopt security practices (Federal Trade Commission v. Wyndham Worldwide Corporation,
et al., Stipulated Order for Injunction, 2020; Wyndham Settles FTC Charges It Unfairly
Placed Consumers’ Payment Card Information At Risk 2015). A second court case chal-
lenging the FTC’s Section 5 authority on data breach cases occurred with LabMD, whom
the FTC filed a complaint against in 2013. Ultimately, the court sided with LabMD on June
6th, 2018. In 2019, the 11th Circuit ordered the FTC to pay legal fees amounting to over
$843,000 to LabMD. However, as this decision was based on the vagueness of the pro-
posed remedy, it may not limit the FTC’s authority regarding data breaches. More recent
consent agreements have attempted to define security program requirements with greater
specificity.
3.3.2 Other FTC Relevant Authorities
Three additional cybersecurity regulations play a significant role in the FTC’s cyber au-
thorities. These include the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) (2013),
Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information (2002), and the FTC “Red Flag Rule”
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(,2020).
Since COPPA passed in 2012, the FTC has cited this law in filings against companies
whose breach affected minors. COPPA regulations (16 CFR Part 312) require that “the
operator must establish and maintain reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality,
security, and integrity of personal information collected from children” (Part 312—Chil-
dren’s Online Privacy Protection Rule 2013).
The Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information (2002), also known as the Safe-
guard Rules - 16 CFR Part 314, are FTC requirements first released on May 23, 2002,
which apply consumer information protection rules to financial institutions. These regu-
lations were required by section 501(b) of the GLBA (1999), which instructs agencies to
promulgate rules for financial institutions “to protect against any anticipated threats or haz-
ards to the security or integrity of such [consumer] records.” As this rule proceeds breach
data collection (concurrent with the year California implements breach notification), we
can not test GLBA’s efficacy.
The FTC “Red Flag Rule” (,2020) is a component of the FCRA. While Congress passed
the FCRA in 1970, the part 681 Identity Theft Rules were created under the authority of
the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (Public Law 108–159, sec. 114;
15 U.S.C. 1681m(e).) They appear in the Code of Federal Regulations as “Detection,
Prevention, and Mitigation of Identity Theft” (Part 681—Identity Theft Rules 2007).
3.3.3 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, et al.
One of the most meaningful data security actions by the FTC was its 2012 complaint against
Wyndham Hotels. Wyndham challenged the action, believing that the FTC lacked the “au-
thority to assert an unfairness claim in the data-security context” (Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, et al., Stipulated Order for Injunction 2014, 2).
This case ultimately confirmed the FTC’s authority, expanded its scope to regulate fran-
chisees, and with Wyndham’s settlement mandated Payment Card Industry Data Security
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Standard (PCI DSS) compliance and certification.
A cybersecurity incident at the Phoenix data center of Wyndham Worldwide Corpo-
ration resulted in Russian hackers accessing half a million customers’ records between
2008 and 2010 (Sperry 2012). Wyndham, one of the world’s largest hotel chains, operates
Ramada, Super 8, and Days Inn. The FTC’s complaint against Wyndham suggests that
they “unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed consumers’ personal data” due to a lack of
“reasonable and appropriate security” (2012, 10). This lack of cybersecurity preparedness
ultimately resulted in three separate breaches. A thorough discussion of these incidents is
included in the Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief (Tom et al. 2012).
• In the first incident, on April 2008, a hacker leveraged a local Wyndham-affiliated
hotel’s network to access the broader Hotels and Resorts network. In May of 2018,
the hacker then attempted a brute force attack on an administrator account. The
hacker was ultimately successful and gained administrator privileges. In the process,
however, 212 user accounts were locked out. This alerted the company to a problem,
but they failed to identify the breach until four months later. The hacker installed
“memory-scraping malware” to collect temporary credit card data on the server and
found payment card data on the company server in plain text.
• A second breach occurred in March 2009; hackers accessed the account with a “ser-
vice provider’s administrator account.” With this new access, hackers continued us-
ing the memory-scraping malware and changed the hotel’s software outputting credit
card account data in clear text files. Also, in May 2009, Wyndham Hotel, based
on reports of fraudulent charges by customers, scanned the network and found the
memory-scraping malware installed at 30 Wyndham branded hotels.
• The final breach occurred in late 2009; the hackers were again able to gain access to
an administrator account. They reinstalled the memory-scraping malware. The com-
promise extended to 28 hotels. Eight of which were directly managed by Wyndham
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Hotel Management, while 20 were franchises of Hotel and Resort.
Ultimately, the FTC attributed these three incidents to the lack of firewalls between
Wyndham Hotel servers, local networks, and the Internet. The injunction suggests that
619,000 payment accounts were stolen, leading to 10.6 million dollars in fraudulent losses.
The FTC identified the actions as violating Section 5(a) of the FTC Act.
Wyndham’s challenge of this complaint identified three issues to justify a motion to
dismiss the unfairness claim (Federal Trade Commission v. Wyndham Worldwide Corpo-
ration, et al., Stipulated Order for Injunction 2014).
• The first issue the challenge identified was a lack of explicit FTC authority, analogiz-
ing the case to FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
In this analogous case, the courts denied the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s
authority to regulate tobacco products.
• The second issue identified by Wyndham was that the FTC had not promulgated
regulations before it made its complaint. This perceived absence was identified as
violating the fair notice principles.
• Finally, Wyndham claimed that the FTC did not adequately demonstrate a claim for
either unfairness or deception. They suggested that the complaint was not consistent
with federal pleading requirements.
The District Court of New Jersey found in favor of the FTC, rejecting the three claims
by Wyndham. Wyndham subsequently appealed to the Third Circuit, Philadelphia appeals
court. In August of 2015, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court decision in favor
of the FTC, setting a new precedent (Federal Trade Commission v. Wyndham Worldwide
Corporation, et Al. 2015). In December 2015, Wyndham would finally settle with the
FTC (Federal Trade Commission v. Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, et Al. 2015). The
settlement would require the adoption of a comprehensive information security program.
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3.4 NY Department of Financial Services Regulations
The NY DFS enacted comprehensive cybersecurity regulations on March 1, 2017. These
regulations were formally promulgated as Part 500 of Title 23 of the Official Compilation
of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York (23 New York Codes, Rules and
Regulations (NYCRR) 500), referred to throughout this work as the “NY DFS regulations”
(In the Matter of Tuition Options LLC and Edvantage LLC Consent Order, 2020).
The state created the NY DFS when the New York State Banking Department and the
New York State Insurance Department merged on October 3, 2011, under the Financial
Services Law. This change allowed the Department to “oversee a broader array of financial
products and services.” Appointed by the governor, a Superintendent of Financial Services
leads the department. Maria T. Vullo served as Superintendent from 2016-2019. Her tenure
covered the periods preceding the passage of the regulations and its implementation phase.
The provisions of the NY DFS regulations require that covered entities: write a cy-
bersecurity policy (§ 500.03), appoint a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) (§
500.04), perform regular penetration testing and vulnerability assessments (§ 500.05), gen-
erate audit trails (§ 500.06), limit user access privileges (§ 500.07), create procedures
for evaluating, assessing, or testing applications (§ 500.08), conduct risk assessments (§
500.09), provide cybersecurity training (§ 500.10), create policies for third-party service
providers (§ 500.11), implement multi-factor authentication (500.12), limit data retention
(§ 500.13), monitor authorized use (§ 500.14), encrypt non-public information where fea-
sible (§ 500.15), and develop an incident response plan (§ 500.16) (Cybersecurity Require-
ments for Financial Services Companies, 2020).
These policies entered into force 180 days from the effective date with annual reporting
requirements to the NY DFS starting on February 15, 2018. Covered entities including
Banks and Trust Companies, Cash Checkers, Credit Unions, Health Insurers, and Mort-
gage Bankers. Exemptions to these regulations were created for companies with fewer
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than ten employees, less than 5,000,000 in annual revenue, or 10,000,000 in total year-end
assets (Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services Companies, 2020). However,
regulated businesses must contact NY DFS to notify them that they are requesting an ex-
emption. This requirement creates a reasonably high standard for compliance where NY
DFS knows specifically who is covered and what they have done to comply.
Enforcement action penalties are set by the superintendent and limited under the New
York Banking Law (Section 44 on Violations and Penalties) (New York Banking Law, Sec.
44 Violations; Penalties, 2020). These penalties have a maximum limit per day, includ-
ing fines of $2,500, $15,000, and $75,000, depending on the recklessness, intention, and
effect of the violator’s action. The first enforcement action by NY DFS was against First
American Title Insurance Company on July 22, 2020 (Department of Financial Services
Announces Cybersecurity Charges Against A Leading Title Insurance Provider For Expos-
ing Millions of Documents with Consumers’ Personal Information 2020). This action was
unusual for NY DFS as it was “one of only two instances we are aware of in which the DFS
issued a Statement of Charges against a financial institution, rather than a Consent Order
or Settlement Agreement” (Dembosky et al. 2020). On March 3, 2021, the NY DFS made
another enforcement action against Residential Mortgage Services Inc. (REM) for viola-
tions of 23 NYCRR 500. REM agreed in its consent agreement to pay 1.5 Million dollars
and submit a Cyber Security Incident Response Plan, Cybersecurity Risk Assessment, and
evidence of Training and Monitoring to NY DFS (New York State Department of Financial
Services, In the Matter of Residential Mortgage Inc. 2021). Another significant consent
order was signed with National Securities Corporation on April 21, 2021, with an agreed
payment of three million (Press Release 2021).
Implementation Schedule for NY DFS Regulations:
June 2018 - NY DFS expand cybersecurity regulations to “cover consumer credit report-
ing agencies that reported on 1,000 or more New York consumers” (New York State
Department of Financial Services 2018). The initial announcement by Governor
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Cuomo was made in September 2017 and was identified as a response to the Equifax
hack. This announcement entailed a “phased in schedule of compliance, starting
April 4, 2018” (Governor Cuomo Announces New Actions to Protect New Yorkers’
Personal Information in Wake of Equifax Security Breach 2017).
March 2018 - First CISO reporting deadline to NY DFS.
March 2019 - Requirement for multi-factor authentication comes into effect.
The NY DFS regulations have, since their initial proposal, been generally well-received.
In 2017, the Ponemon Institute prepared an industry survey to measure preparedness for
New York State’s cybersecurity regulations. One of the survey findings was that 60% of
participants thought that compliance was more challenging than GLBA, HIPAA, or Sar-
banes–Oxley Act (SOX), and 65% anticipated compliance would improve their cyberse-
curity posture (NYC NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 Cybersecurity Event A Big Success 2017).
Ultimately, the NY DFS regulations informed the development of model legislation by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in December 2018 (Insurance Data
Security Model Law 2017). Several states subsequently adopted this model legislation,
including Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, Virginia, Indiana, Michigan,
Ohio, Virginia, Delaware, and New Hampshire (11 states as of June 16, 2020) (Weather-
ford, McAdam, and Bradstreet 2020).
3.4.1 Other New York Regulatory Actions
Since the implementation of NY DFS regulations, the New York legislature and NY DFS
have taken several actions to improve cybersecurity in New York. Governor Cuomo signed
S.5575B, the Stop Hacks and Improve Electronic Data Security Act (SHIELD Act), into
law on July 25, 2019 (NY State Senate Bill S5575B 2019). This legislation functionally re-
sembles the Massachusetts Data Security Law, requiring that firms implement “reasonable
data security” and “provides standards tailored to the size of a business” to protect the PII
of New York residents. These new SHIELD Act regulations included creating an informa-
tion security program, designating employees to oversee the program, training employees
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to meet standards, and implementing a wide range of risk management strategies and tech-
nical safeguards. The regulation gave businesses given 240 days to come into compliance
with SHIELD Act on March 21, 2020.
The SHIELD Act served as the first significant amendment to New York’s 2005 Infor-
mation Security Breach and Notification Act (S05827 Summary: 2021). This 2005 law was
part of the first wave of data breach reporting requirements established in 2005. The law
was ahead of its time, requiring reporting to several state agencies, including the Attorney
General, the Consumer Protection Board, and the State Office of Cyber Security and Crit-
ical Infrastructure Coordination (“OCSCIC”) (Reinke 2006). New York was even early to
provide a form for affected parties to identify details about the breach. Yet, an initial effort
at an open record request with the New York Attorney General’s office produced 2,888
pages of records on November 21, 2019, covering incidents around 2019; however, these
records did not date back to the NY DFS cybersecurity regulations’ implementation.
In addition to the SHIELD Act, New York, starting in 2018, passed several pieces of
cybersecurity legislation, beginning with S.B. 6886, which removed fees from consumers
freezing their credit report following a data breach. In 2019, the SHIELD Act was passed
on the same day; the governor also signed AB 2374, which required credit reporting agen-
cies to provide identity theft prevention in the event of a breach of the agency’s system.
This law was a response to the 2017 Equifax breach. Governor Cuomo would ultimately
settle with Equifax for 19.2 million dollars. North American Industry Classification Sys-
tem (NAICS) identified no other breach-related legislation from 2010-2017 (see Table A.1).
In addition to these statewide changes, on May 22, 2019, NY DFS Superintendent Linda
Lacewell created a new Cybersecurity Division to oversee these regulations and appointed
Justin Herring (former Chief of the Cybercrimes Unit of the US Attorney’s Office for the




As the United States has not yet developed a comprehensive regulatory cybersecurity regime
(FTC enforcements notwithstanding), these piecemeal initiatives create quasi-experimental
opportunities for nonequivalent control group research using segmented regression. A
nonequivalent control group design is defined as “an experimental group and a control
group both given a pretest and posttest, but in which the control group and the experi-
mental group do not have pre-experimental sampling equivalence” (Campbell and Stanley
1963, 47-50). By subdividing the regulatory regimes by affected states or industries, one
can compare breach frequency trends before and after initiating the policy with a control
group. As breach frequency is stochastic and variable from month to month, an improved
design is the “Comparative Design Interrupted Time-Series” (55). Table 4.1 demonstrates
how multiple observations (shown as Os in the table below) may be made before and after
the intervention (shown as an X). This approach is considered a highly effective quasi-
experimental design that addresses core internal validity issues related to selection and
maturation.
Table 4.1: Comparative Design Interrupted Time-Series




Control Group O13O14O15O16O17O18 O19O20O21O22O23O24
Source: Campbell and Stanley (1963, 55)
A benefit to exploring regulatory interventions with quasi-experiments is that the en-
actment of regulation and its ultimate enforcement have clearly defined dates. These dates
provide for a period of adoption, after which we would expect to see the effects of the
policy in place. Linking disparate policy experiments with a shared policy logic can be
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integrated into a more extensive research question.
Research Question: Have regulatory cyber policy interventions effectively reduced the
frequency of data breach incidents, ceteris paribus?
I selected four cases to operationalize this research question (see chapter 3) to support a
claim of external validity. While quantitative rather than qualitative in the research design
approach, I intended case selection to follow a replication logic. As “replication logic [in
case studies] is directly analogous to that used in multiple experiments” (Yin 2017, 55). In
this research, the selected cases are quasi-experiments with a shared policy logic. The cases
are discussed separately in chapter 3 and chapter 5 and comparatively in chapter 6. This
comparative approach resembles qualitative comparative case analysis, a methodological
approach whose use in public policy was explored by Agranoff and Radin (1991).
While the literature on cybersecurity policy evaluation research is surveyed briefly in
chapter 2, this research has been comparatively underdeveloped in large part because of
perceived data limitations. This research is an ambitious attempt to bring to the cyberse-
curity domain an objective and metrics-based approach for evaluating state and national
policies. This process requires overcoming a range of data and statistical concerns.
Most notably, many datasets used in the breach notification literature suffer from sam-
pling bias, as many datasets rely on publicly reported incidents (i.e., news reports) rather
than mandatory reporting. Another statistical challenge is overcoming critiques that the
cyber environment has changed between time 1 and time 2. These global factors may re-
late to changes in technology, vulnerabilities, organizational policies, or underlying crim-
inal enterprise. While it limits which policy interventions may be explored, the quasi-
experimental comparative research design overcomes several statistical challenges. Based
on this technique, one can assume that similar states or industries would be subject to sim-
ilar global factors. Consequently, effort must be taken with non-equivalent control groups
to justify that they are similar enough to the treatment subject to be similarly affected by
global factors. Accomplishing this requires matching or thoughtful selection (i.e., bor-
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dering jurisdictions). State-level breach notification counts can not be directly compared
as states have varying populations and resident requirements for notification. To achieve
cross-comparable incident populations, I employed a simple per capita measure.




• b̄freq = Simple Count of Breaches in a given Month for State X
• popstate = Estimate of Population of State X in Millions on a given Month
To calculate state populations in a given month, I downloaded US Census Annual Popu-
lation Estimates (2019) and applied a simple linear model to impute the population change
each month (see Table D.1). As the number of incidents is frequently smaller than a state’s
population, I re-scaled population values to be in the millions. Matching this state popu-
lation estimate with the incident frequency, I could then calculate the number of incidents
per million residents to produce a new value labeled ‘incident permil.’
Incident frequency or incident per million serves as time-series variables that can be
subset for eight months before and following the policy’s implementation. According to
Penfold and Zhang (2013), eight intervals for pre and post-tests serve as a minimum re-
quirement for ITS. The minimal period of eight months was used across all cases to limit
conflicts with other relevant events that could present an alternative hypothesis (except for
a robustness check that used 12 months for the NY DFS case).
This work seeks to generalize the finding of the four individual cases. Each case mea-
sures the effect of a form of regulation that mandates affected parties adopt information
security programs. The four regulations are then compared across the scope of their cov-
erage, contents of the regulation, dates of implementation, and the threat of sanction for
non-compliance.
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The methods discussed below will address data processing, methodological choices
unique to each case, and the comparative interrupted time-series analysis. Finally, as part
of this broader dissertation, there is a brief discussion of additional empirical data sources
that could be used in future research opportunities but could not be incorporated into the
quasi-experimental models used in this research.
4.1 Data Processing
Data collection and cleaning were a particular challenge to this effort. While the sources
and data cleaning methodology are discussed at a higher level in the subsequent sections,
interested readers can learn more about the coding effort and data sources in Appendix D.
4.1.1 Data Collection
To avoid issues with selection bias, this research effort leveraged mandatory state breach
notification reports. To identify reporting states, I initially identified data from the “U.S.
State Data Breach Lists” resource maintained by the International Association of Privacy
Professionals (IAPP) (U.S. State Data Breach Lists, 2020). The IAPP keeps this list up-
dated with links to “U.S. state agencies that publish lists of reported data breaches in their
respective state.” In addition to this list, I systematically surveyed state notification leg-
islation to see which states were required to report their information to a Department of
Consumer Affairs or the Attorney General. For those states that did not publicly list their
data, I filed open records requests. This data collection effort far exceeded the needs of
the four quasi-experiments that form the core of this research effort. However, this com-
prehensive approach creates resources (datasets and code) that can be leveraged for future
research work that builds on this initial effort. A list of the corresponding sources collected
for each state is included here:
List of States and Sources:
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• California: https://www.oag.ca.gov/privacy/databreach/list


















• New Hampshire: https://www.doj.nh.gov/consumer/security-breaches/a.htm
• New Jersey: https://www.doj.nh.gov/consumer/security-breaches/a.htm
• North Carolina: https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource center/North Carolina State
Data Breaches.pdf
• North Dakota: https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource center/North Dakota Data
Breaches 2018.pdf
• Oregon: https://justice.oregon.gov/consumer/DataBreach/
• Rhode Island: Received incidents through open records request filed with the state
• South Carolina: Received incidents through open records request filed with the state
• Vermont: https://ago.vermont.gov/data-security-breaches/
• Virginia: Received incidents through open records request filed with the state, records





I compiled state-level breach data from a variety of file formats. For breaches collected
in Portable Document Format, i.e., PDFs (Indiana, Massachusetts, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Virginia), these files were opened using Adobe Acrobat Pro software and exported
into Microsoft Excel (a spreadsheet software application). For most cases thought, I manu-
ally extracted the data from state websites (California, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland,
Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin). In the future, it
would be helpful to have web scraping scripts to automate this work.
4.1.2 Data Cleaning
The initial process of data cleaning could, in many cases, not be automated and required
significant manual labor in the form of data entry and manipulation. Where needed, I used
Excel for manual data entry and manipulation. In only two cases (Maine and Connecticut)
was the data already made available in a usable machine-readable format. To the extent
possible, data cleaning code was written in R, “a language and environment for statistical
computing” (R Core Team 2020). Ultimately, I saved state breach data in a comma separate
value (.csv) format that closely approximates the original data file.
As states collect different meta-data from breached companies, the initial column titles
were kept in the raw data. The first order of data cleaning was to remove excess information
from organization names. Columns with multiple dates listing the ‘date of breach’ and ‘end
of breach’ were split. Columns were given common variable names. Values that had been
assigned “yes” or “no” were replaced with “1” and “0,” respectively. A column was also
created naming the state of collection for every row. Data sets were then merged with the
function rbind.
All breach data contained a date corresponding to its collection by a state agency. Dates
were converted into a consistent format using the R package lubridate (Grolemund and
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Wickham 2011). In 557 cases, the collected data could not be consistently formatted and
these incidents were dropped. All incidents could then be sorted by their state collection
date.
Name cleaning was then applied manually across 32,753 unique incident names to cre-
ate common names for incidents referenced by multiple states. A new column with the
clean name was added to the data frame. The dataset could then be sorted alphabetically
by ‘org name’ and then by ‘date of breach.’ New variables were created identifying a
date 14-days before and 14-days after the reporting date for every incident. These pre and
post-dates were used to create an interval for the specified time range. A for loop then
identified incidents as a ‘truematch’ for rows where the org name matches the previous
row, and reporting dates occur within 28-days of each other. Unique incidents were then
numbered based on an algorithm (Listing Line 4.1.2) ordered first by earliest date and then
alphabetically.
Listing 4.1: Code Used to Number Matching Incidents
j = 0
f o r ( i i n 1 : nrow ( A l l S t a t e 1 ) ) {
i f ( A l l S t a t e 1 $ t r u e m a t c h [ i ] == ”TRUE” ){ A l l S t a t e 1 $ i n c i d e n t i d [ i ] = j }
i f ( A l l S t a t e 1 $ t r u e m a t c h [ i ] == ”FALSE” ){ A l l S t a t e 1 $ i n c i d e n t i d [ i ] = j +1}
j = A l l S t a t e 1 $ i n c i d e n t i d [ i ]
}
The first step to transform the vertical to a horizontal data structure was to use the dcast
function of the rshape package (Wickham 2007). This function created new columns for
incidents’ corresponding states, designated with a dummy variable. Incident numbering
subsequently provided the basis for combining these rows using the aggregate function to
create an incident database combining like columns.
Listing 4.2: Code Used to Combine Incidents
A l l S t a t e C l e a n <− a g g r e g a t e ( BreachID [ , NamesDDPLY ] ,
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by=BreachID [ ’ i n c i d e n t i d ’ ] ,
f u n c t i o n ( x ) c ( p a s t e ( un i qu e ( x [ ! i s . na ( x ) ] ) ,
c o l l a p s e =” , ” ) )
)
This script converted a dataset of state-reported incidents into a database of 19590
unique incidents, with state reference columns. Merged incidents were then sorted by the
earliest reporting date. Consequently, all these disparate state data sets were merged into
one organized file for analysis. For additional information about how to access the code
used for data cleaning, see Cleaning RawBreachData.Rmd in Table D.1.
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Captured Incidents
Statistics Measure
Number of captured incidents 54,338
Incidents dropped for No Reported Date 559
Incidents dropped for Amended Submission 45
Incidents dropped for Unclear Org Name 14
Incidents remaining after drops 53,720
Breaches after incident matching 19,590
Additional state breach incidents can be incorporated from other public data sources,
such as those maintained by the Clearinghouse and HHS (see AllSourceBreachData.Rmd
in Table D.1). Incorporating additional data sources requires a duplication of a number
of the steps described above. To maintain the ability to limit the dataset to mandatory
reporting, events were coded with a separate reference variable, and a new variable was
created to indicate when incidents were reported by one of the collecting states. While
useful for its metadata, the frequency of incidents in Figure 4.1 suggests the problems with
existing data sources. Clearinghouse shows significant yearly variability in reporting as
it uses media reporting as a source. In contrast, HHS shows fairly flat yearly reporting
suggesting limited sectoral developments over time.
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Figure 4.1: Data Breach Incidents by Year in Public Datasets

















4.2 Methodological Approach for each Case
Each of the four cases requires unique methodological decisions to design an appropriate
quasi-experiment. These cases may contain either one or several tests of efficacy through
the application of quasi-experimental methods.
This research employs a comparative ITS design for three cases: the Massachusetts
Data Security Standard, the HITECH Act, and the NY DFS cybersecurity regulations. The
FTC Wyndham actions lack a control population but are evaluated with the interrupted
time-series research design. Each of these regulatory interventions is explored with two
to three variants. What follows are descriptions of the methodological decisions made for
each case.
Table 4.3: Case Analysis and Methodology















Pre-Test Date Sept 2008 Feb 2009 March 2017 NA
Post-Test Date March 2010 May 2009 Sept 2018 NA
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4.2.1 Case 1: Massachusetts Data Security Law
Hypothesis 1A: The Massachusetts Data Security Law reduced the growth rate of data
breach reports for companies doing business in the state of Massachusetts.
To test the effect of the Massachusetts Data Security Standard, I compare the effect on
Massachusetts with that on New Hampshire and North Carolina. North Carolina started
collecting data in 2005, Massachusetts and New Hampshire in 2007. While the impact of
the Massachusetts Standard technically has national implications for business, I identify the
subset of incidents not reported in both states to confirm that a subset of incidents is unique
to each state. Those companies with breaches that did not report customers from the state
of Massachusetts would not need to comply with Massachusetts law. Consequently, we
might reasonably suspect that their behavior would remain independent of this legislation.
New Hampshire
New Hampshire’s legislation resembles Massachusetts in that it covers incidents affecting
even a single resident. However, the proximity between Massachusetts and New Hamp-
shire means New Hampshire-based companies might reasonably consider working to com-
ply with Massachusetts law.
North Carolina
North Carolina’s data breach notification law only required notification of breaches affect-
ing 1000+ residents through 2009. Because the Massachusetts Data Security Law was
implemented on September 22, 2008, comparing the two states requires using a count of
only those Massachusetts incidents where 1000+ residents were reported affected.
Of potential concern with this specific case is the risk that the treatment might impact
the control group. However, given that we have evidence of which breach incidents affected
both states, we can infer that a sizable sample of enterprises is non-overlapping, thereby
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indicating that they either a) do not do business with residents in the other state or b)
intentionally or unknowingly are flouting reporting requirements.
4.2.2 Case 2: HITECH Act
Hypothesis 1B: The HITECH Act reduced the growth rate of data breach reports in the
healthcare sector. To test the effect of the HITECH Act, I coded the industry data of af-
fected firms during the period before and after implementation. For industry coding, I used
the database Mergent Intellect by FTSE Russell to export industry identifiers, including
Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) and NAICS codes for all collected incidents
from 2005-2010 with an org name that could be matched to a record in the database. The
Healthcare sector (NAICS 62) is then compared with all non-healthcare sector industries
as well as a close sector comparison, Finance (NAICS 52).
As the HITECH Act was national legislation affecting a specific industry, the appro-
priate treatment group would be the healthcare sector across collecting states. This quasi-
experiment consequently used the combined incidents reported by six states (North Car-
olina, New Hampshire, Hawaii, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Maine). While these
states have different reporting standards, these standards did not change during the quasi-
experimental period. The implementation phase for the HITECH Act was fairly short as
the policy was enacted on February 17, 2009, and came into enforcement fairly quickly on
May 27, 2009.
4.2.3 Case 3: NY DFS Regulations
Hypothesis 1D: The NY Department of Financial Services regulations have reduced the
growth rate of data breaches in the New York Financial Sector.
NY DFS regulations implemented in 2017 were the most recent regulatory intervention I
looked at, presenting the opportunity to leverage more extensive data collection and public
reporting by states. Unfortunately, I was still unable to draw on data directly from New
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York state. An open records request resulted in the receipt of a PDF document several
thousands of pages long that contained individual letters mailed to the state by breached
entities. As these documents did not cover the targeted quasi-experimental period for NY
DFS cybersecurity regulations, I did not code these documents. Instead, I identified that
two reporting states (Maine and Connecticut) included information on the location of firms’
headquarters that allowed me to identify New York businesses.
Companies regulated by the New York Department of Financial Services and the NAICS
finance and insurance sector are not a perfect match. Nevertheless, this research design as-
sumes a sufficient overlap, such that NAICS code 52 serves as an adequate proxy for the
1,800 insurance companies and 1,500 banking and other financial service corporations reg-
ulated by NY DFS. I could not identify a list of the firms regulated under NY DFS authority;
otherwise, this would have served as an even better designation than industry.
To designate industry, I used two different approaches for data reporting from Maine
and Connecticut. Connecticut’s data included an industry designation that the filer could
complete. I reviewed these self-designated industry identifiers and assigned an appropriate
NAICS code using the ’NAICS & SIC Identification Tools’ service at www.NAICS.com/
search. In contrast, Maine’s data only added an industry identifier starting in late 2018.
Consequently, I used the database Mergent Intellect by FTSE Russell, which includes ac-
cess to the D&B Million Dollar Directory (MDDI) and allows for the generation of DUNS
and NAICS codes.
The NY DFS regulations, unlike the Massachusetts Data Security Standard, apply to a
specific subset of in-state companies. They are not applying regulations that would require
compliance by out-of-state companies. This significantly reduces the risk of the treatment
affecting the control population.
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4.2.4 Case 4: FTC Section 5
Hypothesis 1C: FTC Section 5 enforcement authorization expansion through Wyndham
Hotels reduces the likelihood of national breaches. As FTC Section 5 regulations pre-date
the data source, rather than judging a law or regulation for the FTC case, I focus on a
significant expansion of FTC enforcement authority with the 2012 Wyndham Hotel law-
suit. The FTC Complaint against Wyndham Hotels contains two essential interventions.
The first is the publicity around the initial complaint, which received significant media
attention, including a New York Times article (Wyatt 2012). A second intervention was
the decision by the Third Circuit to affirm the regulatory authority of the FTC, which had
been put in doubt by the multi-year case instigated by Wyndham Hotel’s challenge to the
complaint. Both interventions presented a significant expansion of cybersecurity liability
from franchisors to franchisees that would have ramifications across the economy and gov-
ernment recognition of PCI DSS certification. This impact is consequently measured with
two ITS quasi-experiments. This analysis used the combined incidents reported by seven
states (North Carolina, New Hampshire, Hawaii, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Maine,
and Iowa).
4.3 Comparative Interrupted Time-Series
Regression equation:
y = α + β1T + β2X + β3XT + β4Z + β5ZT + β6ZX + β7ZXT + ε
Where:
Z = treatment as 1 or control as 0,
ZT = time for treatment and 0 for control,
ZX = study phase for treatment and 0 for control,
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ZXT = time after interruption for treatment and 0 for control
The above formula and labels were directly pulled from Caswell (2019, 3). While
Caswell (2018) describes a SAS macro to produce comparative ITS, my research was com-
pleted using R. Consequently, I created R code to produce an identical data frame to that
used as part of the proposed regression and imputed the “Rate” values with summative
month incident counts (sometimes scaled for population).
The data frame required for the regression is made by appending the treatment and
the control. An example data frame used for the comparative ITS analysis for the Mas-
sachusetts Data Security Law is included in the Appendix as Table B.1. With this data
frame, I ran an ordinary least square (OLS) regression that produced estimates, standard
errors, and probabilities for each of the eight parameters. The eight parameters measure
different aspects of the time-series lines shown in subsequent figures.
• β1: Control Pre-Trend
• β2: Control Post-Level Change
• β3: Control Post-Trend Change
• β4: Treatment/Control Pre-Level Difference
• β5: Treatment/Control Pre-Trend Difference
• β6: Treatment/Control Post-Level Difference
• β7: Treatment/Control Change in Slope Difference Pre- to Post-
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4.4 Other Variables for Future Research
The following material was collected in the process of seeking to identify prospective sup-
plementary analyses that would leverage additional control variables. Ultimately I did
not pursue this approach as I could not find a way to integrate these variables into the
quasi-experimental design of this research. Time-series regression models would ideally
be paired with control values measured every month for the corresponding treatment and
control groups.
4.4.1 Data Breach Letters
Despite not being integrated into this research, I began coding metadata from template let-
ters collected from the 17 states where I compiled notification letters. These states include
California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Vermont, Washington.
To manage these individual documents, I used the software Tropy developed by the Center
for History and New Media at George Mason University. The Tropy software is designed
for archives to manage letters and images and is appropriate to a project that requires or-
ganizing letters. A novel metadata template (i.e., ontology) was created to make the Tropy
tool more suitable for tracking data breach notification letters. This ontology creates rich
textual properties such as ‘date of breach,’ ‘residents affected,’ ‘hack type,’ etc., that can be
filled out for each letter.
This coding project would ultimately serve several purposes 1) it populates new state
data collected from open records requests 2) these letters contain descriptions of the nature
of the breach that could be useful if attempting to identify hacking-related incidents 3)
recording notification date and discovery date would improve cross-state incident matching.
However, based on this initial experience, 2-3 research assistants would likely be needed to
make any meaningful progress.
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4.4.2 Reports of Identity Theft
While not essential to this research, I submitted an FOI to the FTC for monthly state reports
of identity theft. This data was also collected by Romanosky et al. (2011) for the years
2002-2009 through an FOI request. The FTC has continued to collect this data and publish
it annually in the Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book (2013), in a summarized form.
I ultimately received a response to my request with data from 2015-2020. Unfortu-
nately, this did not go back far enough to use it as a robustness check against any of the
quasi-experiments explored in this work. However, it could help to confirm the findings
through an alternative dependent variable. The diagram in chapter 1 modeled how iden-
tity theft is downstream of data breaches. In theory, one could control for reported data
breaches to see if there is a tangible effect independent of increased breach discovery and
reporting. This research is a project for future work.
4.4.3 Federal Spending on Cybersecurity
As my research project focused on nationwide legislation, one of the factors I saw as po-
tentially relevant to this effort was a measure of government capacity. I sought out data on
government spending as it related to cybersecurity initiatives and compiled the available
data. Chief Financial Officers Act (CFO) Agency1 spending was tracked by the organi-
zation Taxpayers for Common Sense (“Taxpayers”) between 2008 and 2016. Funded by
the Hewlett Foundation, this initiative claims to have “searched publicly available federal
budget submissions to Congress and budget justification documents to identify programs”
Taxpayers then “analyzed those documents to identify individual budget lines that con-
tain programs that the government acknowledges relate to cyber spending” (Database of
Unclassified Cyber Spending, 2020).
After this initiative had completed its work, the White House, through the Office of
1Under the Chief Financial Officers Act, 24 federal departments and agencies are defined as CFO Agen-
cies. With an appointment of a Chief Financial Officer, they have additional budgetary reporting requirements
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Figure 4.2: Cybersecurity Spending by the Federal Government in Billions of Dollars























Source: Taxpayers for Common Sense
Source: Office of Management and Budget
Management and Budget (OMB), began releasing their own CFO Agency spending esti-
mates (Efficient, Effective, Accountable An American Budget, Fiscal Year 2019, 2020; A
Budget for A Better America, Fiscal Year 2020, 2020). Taxpayers and the government ap-
plied very different standards that make these two sources not cross-comparable, as demon-
strated in Figure 4.2. However, one can identify from this data collection effort a linear
growth rate of 2.2 additional billion dollars per year up to 2016 and 850 million dollars per
year from 2017 to 2019.
4.4.4 Cyber Vulnerabilities and Hygiene
Two potential future sources of vulnerability could serve as global factors for the proposed
models, National Vulnerability Database (NVD) Vulnerability Severity (,n.d.) or Cyber-
Green (2020). One prospective way to use the NVD Vulnerability Severity data as a metric
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for broader cyber vulnerability would be to identify a count of newly posted vulnerabilities
in the NVD within a specific window of time (defined as a standard patch window). This
count would then be weighted for the severity of the vulnerabilities.
Of potential interest for control variables would be to control for global cyber hygiene.
Initially sponsored by Japan’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), the Cyber-
Green (2020) project was developed by Dan Geer to measure how national cyber hygiene
creates the potential for exploitation by adversaries. The index measures a count of com-
monly misconfigured protocols by Autonomous System Number (ASN) and weighs Dis-
tributed Denial of Service (DDoS) potential as the risk that a nation’s internet infrastructure
will be leveraged to host attacks on third-party countries. I pulled this data to explore its
potential, summarizing it below by year and risk type to measure the scope.2
Table 4.4: CyberGreen Risk Types by Year.
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Risk Type 1 94711 1293147 1678042 1188379 2329170 3029327
Risk Type 2 1192755 1322560 1290507 1074492 2231511 2298575
Risk Type 4 199838 882042 794122 736749 1118179 1389725
Risk Type 5 0 0 494565 378711 452614 441294
Risk Type 6 0 0 102595 248608 0 0
Risk Type 7 0 0 0 0 67487 73416
2Oddly, the CyberGreen’s Metrics document does not specify the meaning of the different risk types.






Across four targeted cases, only the NY DFS regulations showed a statistically significant
decrease in the level of breaches after a policy intervention. This post-treatment difference
in breaches held up when replicated for a second collecting state. I observed this trend
comparing breaches from the New York financial sector with breaches affecting the finance
sector elsewhere. However, this finding was not consistent when comparing breach counts
for the New York financial sector to all other New York sectors, as New York state saw a
generalized decrease in breaches during the relevant dates. I did not find a significant drop
in data breach incident reporting following the regulatory intervention in the other three
cases. This general lack of post-treatment level significance could result from unspecified
confounding effects or the interventions’ weakness. One explanation for this difference
could be that the requirements embedded in the NY DFS regulations are more extensive
than the requirements in the other three cases. Also, the penalties for non-compliance
appeared to be steeper (and were denominated by day rather than by violation).
Consequently, there are substantive reasons to assume that the NY DFS intervention
may have been more effective than the other three cases. However, the NY DFS inter-
vention may suffer from a regression towards the mean, as the New York financial sector
reported significantly more incidents in 2020.
As part of this research project, some descriptive findings drawing on a decade of breach
data seem to be meaningful. These findings are addressed in section 5.2.
• Across all states, there is a slow but persistent rate of growth in breach incidents at
approximately 20% per year.
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• The number of individuals affected by a breach has an exponential distribution with
a λ of 1.471129e-09.
Spatial and temporal findings also present themselves as insightful. The method for
deriving these findings is included in section 5.3, and their implications are discussed in
section 6.1.
• There is a similar number of breaches per-capita in states with similar reporting re-
quirements.
• The consistent seasonal variation observed in data breach reporting increased in the
Spring and decreased in the Fall.
An analysis of the NY DFS case will follow in section 5.4. The remaining three reg-
ulatory cases without a significant intervention are then presented in chronological order.
Analysis for all four cases will include an overview of case-specific data methods, followed
by trends in the underlying time-series data, and a discussion of regressions results. Finally,
there is a brief discussion of statistical tests. The implications of these findings is discussed
in greater depth in chapter 6.
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Drawing on the state-level data described in the prior data collection section, descriptive
statistics provide valuable findings regarding the magnitude, character, and direction of
data breaches over the past decade. There were a total of 54,340 reports of data breaches
captured from 21 reporting states. After data cleaning and incident matching, this left
19,592 overall breach incidents. Table 5.1 describes the procedures for dropping data. The
methods for name matching and merging state-level data sets are explored in more detail
in chapter 4.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Captured Incidents
Statistics Measure
Number of captured incidents 54,340
Incidents dropped for No Reported Date 559
Incidents dropped for Amended Submission 45
Incidents dropped for Unclear Org Name 14
Incidents remaining after drops 53,722
Breaches after incident matching 19,592
Graphing the yearly frequencies of state breach reports while normalizing for state
population reveals a close relationship between state incident frequencies over time. Fig-
ure 5.1 shows frequencies for states without reporting thresholds. This figure demonstrates
that for states without a residency limit, the frequency of breach reports clusters around
100 breaches per million state residents per year in 2018. Some smaller states reported
significantly more incidents, including New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, and Montana.
Based on this figure, we may assume that smaller population states show a higher number
of breach reports per million residents systematically and not merely a product of more
significant variance.
Figure 5.1: Breaches per Million with no Resident Limits























One can also look at those states that only require reporting if more than 250, 500 or
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1000 residents are affected. As seen in Figure 5.2, the frequency of breaches per year
for those states that require reporting when 1000+ residents are affected cluster around
five incidents per million residents per year in 2019. States with more frequent breach re-
ports per million residents per year include Oregon, Delaware, and Rhode Island. Notably,
their reporting requirements are triggered when a smaller number of residents are affected.
Oregon’s breach reporting requirement has a residency requirement of 250 people, while
Delaware and Rhode Island have a residency requirement of 500. Both Washington and
California seem to cluster with those states that have a higher reporting requirement. State
population size plays a role in reported breach frequency per million, with Washington and
California showing a lower number than expected.



































Oregon (250) California (500)
Washington (500) Iowa (500)
Delaware (500) Rhode Island (500)
North Carolina (1000) Hawaii (1000)
South Carolina (1000) Wisconsin (1000)
The trendline across states is also consistent once we account for rapid growth between
the initial and second year of adoption and ignore the last collection year. This modified
trendline avoids comparing a full year of data with a partial year of data. Calculating the
Average Growth Rate for these full years for all of the states in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2
shows a fairly consistent growth rate. Averaging the Average Growth Rate across all states
and years yields a 20.4% growth rate with a standard error of 3.5%. Alternatively, if we first
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calculate the mean Average Growth Rate for each state and then average these state values,
it produces a 21.1% growth rate with a standard error of 2.9%. The magnitude of this
linear growth trajectory may reflect some general underlying growth trends. For example,
US population growth between 2006 and 2016 falls below 1%. During this period, the
growth rate for adult Internet users was approximately 2.4% per year, and the growth rate
for home broadband use was 7.7% per year. While these growth trends would reduce the
magnitude of a 20% growth rate, we would still see consistent double-digit growth for
reported breach incidents. In recent years, this consistent trend saw a significant upswing
in the growth rate from 2016 (34.4%) and 2017 (45.5%), followed by a plateau in 2018 and
2019 as incident frequency shrunk by 2%.
5.3 Spatial and Temporal Factors
While media reporting centers national breaches, the bulk of breach reporting appears to
be localized. Figure 5.3 demonstrates this tendency for local reporting using 2018 data.
Figure 5.3: Number of Incidents Reported Across Different States in 2018











Summing the affected states for each incident and sub-setting the data to 2018 (the
year with data collected from the most states) showed that 1603 of 2742 incidents or 59%
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of incidents in that year were only registered in one state (see Figure 5.3). The incidents
reported to the most states in 2018 were Delta Airlines and Task Rabbit, both of which
submitted reports in 19 of the 21 collecting states.
To create the dataset for this analysis, I used the data cleaning methods described in
subsection 4.1.2. This method entailed combining state-level reports by merging incidents
reported by the same organization within a 28-day window of each other. This combination
was necessary as sometimes organizations would choose to provide duplicative submis-
sions updating state agencies in rapid succession. State-level reports were thus integrated
into national incidents (i.e., converting the data from long-form to wide-form).
This integration process is imperfect, as manual data cleaning may have missed asso-
ciated incidents if variable organizational names were cited. Also, a 28-day window, the
maximum range between incidents for matching, was insufficient to capture all breach re-
ports linked to a given national incident. Even with spotty national coverage, Figure 5.3
provides preliminary evidence that breach reporting frequently demonstrates a local effect.
We can also process the data to assess regional similarities in reporting. Table 5.2 shows
the frequency of co-occurrence of incident reports across five national regions for the 2,742
incidents collected in 2018. The frequency of the diagonal shows the total regional inci-
dent account. New England has the highest frequency of reported incidents and shows the
highest co-occurrence with the other four. Variance in regional magnitude is explained by
the particular circumstances of collecting states and the presence or absence of a reporting
requirement.
Table 5.2: Frequency of Reported Breaches Across Regions
Midatlantic Midwest New England South West
Midatlantic 879 420 591 561 329
Midwest 420 820 469 446 287
New England 591 469 1643 657 389
South 561 446 657 1142 315
West 329 287 389 315 599
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5.3.1 Seasonal Decomposition
I decomposed monthly time-series data for several states to identify trend, seasonality,
and randomness components. The decompose function is a default function in the R
programming language. An example decomposition of monthly data from Massachusetts
between 2008 to 2020 is included in Figure 5.4. Observing the underlying trend from
Figure 5.4 shows slow but relatively consistent growth between 2008 and 2016. Growth
rates appear to accelerate over the next year and a half. From mid-2017 to 2020, there
seems to be a plateau in the number of incidents.
Figure 5.4: Sample Decomposition of Additive Time-Series for Massachusetts
Looking just at the season trend, we can segment the data to just a year and compare it
with additional states. I chose the states of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
and Indiana to graph this seasonal variation in Figure 5.5 as they contained five or more
years of data and did not have reporting thresholds.
As incident frequency and variance seem to increase with time, I assumed the decom-
position would be multiplicative, which means that as the incident frequency grows over
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Figure 5.5: Seasonal Variation in Breaches per Million

















New Hampshire North Carolina
Massachusetts Indiana
time, seasonal variation would as well (i.e., Time-series = Trend * Seasonal * Random-
ness). Using a seasonal multiplier (rather than an additive decomposition) also creates a
better scale for comparing various states.
Examining seasonal trends from sampled states (Figure 5.5) shows that the time-series
increases in the Spring and decrease in the Fall. A potential hypothesis to explain this
behavior might be a seasonal increase leading up to April 15th Tax Day or the delayed effect
of reporting for incidents during the holiday shopping season but reported months later. The
seasonal trends of Indiana reflect those of the other states but do seem somewhat magnified.
The decomposition of Indiana only covered six years compared to the 12 available years
for Massachusetts. This difference in the length of the time-series may partially explain
the more significant seasonal variation. The other three states appear to cluster with an
approximately 20% increase in breaches reported in March and an approximately 15%
decrease in November and December. The impact of these findings is briefly explored in
section 6.1.
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Figure 5.6: Histogram of Total Individuals Affected

















5.3.2 Size of Incidents
The most minor incidents recorded in the data affected a single user (1825 incidents). The
three most significant reported incidents were: Marriott with 500 million affected in 2018,
Equifax with 143 million affected in 2017, and Anthem with 80 million affected in 2015.
Initially, the largest incidents in the dataset included Deli Management in 2018 and a com-
bined submission for ‘Cvs, allgenheny [sic], Johnson and Johnson, Microsoft and Pizza
Hut’ in 2015. The first case presents a user-submitted error where an incident affecting 2
million was listed as 2 billion, while the second combined case could not be verified. These
two changes were fixed; however, submission errors of this type in the reports present an
ongoing challenge to using these data sources.
Sub-setting the data before matching to look at the total number of individuals affected
provides records on 10,067 incidents, slightly less than a fifth of the total. The variable
‘total affected’ indicates those affected regardless of residence and is collected and reported
by Indiana, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Wisconsin. Maine began collecting ’total
affected’ in 2018. Figure 5.6 shows a histogram of the number of breaches affecting bin
sizes of 100 (i.e., the frequency of incidents that affected 1-100 people, 101-200 people,
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etc.). From this chart, it becomes clear that there is a diminishing frequency of breaches
that subsequently affect larger bins of 100. The median incident size from this sample was
490 individuals affected (approximately the first five bars). The trend line seems to follow
a power-law distribution; however, subsequent testing shows that it is better described as
an exponential distribution.
Statistical goodness of fit tests were run according to Wiley (2016), who recommends
applying the Kolmogorov Smirnoff (KS) test, comparing the empirical findings to a large
number of synthetic distributions. Alternative distributions were tested, including a power
law, exponential with the xmin, exponential without the xmin, log normal with the xmin,
and log normal without the xmin. Of these, the exponential functions without an xmin
performed the best. The lambda of the exponential function was 1.471129e-09 showing
the best goodness of fit with 2498 of 2500 KS tests failing to reject the null or 99.92% of
the total.
5.4 NY Department of Financial Services Regulations
When the NY DFS regulations were announced on March 1, 2017, Richard Clarke stated:
“With this regulation, DFS is leading the nation in promulgating strong minimum standards
to protect regulated entities and the consumers they serve.” Governor Cuomo described the
regulations as “strong, first-in-the-nation protections.” The 23 NYCRR Part 500 cybersecu-
rity regulation is highly targeted and extensive in its compliance requirements. The regula-
tion provided 180 days for firms to come into compliance, as discussed in section 3.4, and
gave them through the year to submit a certification of compliance. The evidence shows a
statistically significant finding for the efficacy of this intervention. The NY DFS regulation
is shown to reduce the number of breaches compared to the financial industry located out-
side the state. This finding is validated by this research when it was replicated using data
from a second state.
While I filed an open record request with the state of New York on October 2019, the
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documents I ultimately relieved were copies of letters and did not go far enough back in
time to cover the pre-test or implementation phase of the NY DFS regulations. Conse-
quently, for these quasi-experiments, I relied on records collected from the state of Maine
and Connecticut.
5.4.1 Comparing New York Finance to Other Industries with Maine Data
I initially looked to the state of Maine, which has since December 2018 incorporated a
highly detailed “Electronic Maine Security Breach Reporting Form” that contains such
useful information as the state of the reporting entity and primary industry identifiers for
finance, health care, education, and government. The state of Maine requires reporting if a
single resident has been affected. However, as the cybersecurity regulation went into effect
on February 15, 2018, I had to rely on earlier reporting to the state that did not designate
whether the incident was a hack or identify the industry of the affected entity. As with
the HITECH Act case, I employ the database Mergent Intellect by FTSE Russell, which
includes access to the D&B MDDI that allows for the generation of DUNS and NAICS
codes. In this case, industry codes were exclusively used to identify NAICS code 52,
which corresponds to the Finance and Insurance sector. Having coded incidents during the
reporting period, I ultimately was able to identify two-digit NAICS codes for 582 cases of
the 1233 incidents reported in Maine during the eight months before and after the regula-
tory implementation period; this accounts for 47% of the incidents. While 75.9% of the
incidents from this period were identified with their DUNS numbers, not all incidents were
exportable by Mergent Intellect with corresponding NAICS numbers.
The time-series data in Figure 5.7 uses a dotted line to represent the implementation
period, and the solid lines show the eight months pre and post this implementation period.
This convention with dotted and solid lines is used throughout the chapter. In the case
of the treatment, New York financial service firms did not report incidents to Maine dur-
ing this period except for a single incident reported in March 2018 by the private wealth
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s New York Finance
New York Non-Finance
Table 5.3: Comparative ITS NY DFS Regulations (NY Finance Compared to NY Not-
Finance)
Parameter Interpretation Estimate Std Error Probability
α Intercept 0.54 0.79 0.50
β1 Control Pre-Trend 0.38 0.16 0.02 *
β2 Control Post-Level −0.01 1.02 0.99
Change
β3 Control Post-Trend −0.70 0.22 0.00 **
Change
β4 Treatment/Control −0.54 1.11 0.63
Pre-Level Difference
β5 Treatment/Control −0.38 0.22 0.10 .
Pre-Trend Difference
β6 Treatment/Control 0.51 1.45 0.73
Post-Level Difference
β7 Treatment/Control Change 0.62 0.31 0.06 .
in Slope Difference Pre-to Post-
management firm Clarfeld Financial Advisors. The effect of zero incidents over multiple
months is a flat trend line for the treatment. Whether this edge case is meaningful relates at
least in part to whether we would expect New York financial incidents to report in Maine.
Having comprehensive data from 2020 with industry self-identification showed ten unique
financial data breaches reported in that year.
Meanwhile, all other data breaches originating from the state of New York, the control
populations, showed a positive and statistically significant pre-intervention trend β1, as
given in Table 5.3. This trend changes following the intervention with a negative slope
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β3. There is also a modest 90% statistically significant change in slope produced by this
time-series. During the time period of the quasi-experiment, the only data breach security
legislation passed in the state of New York related to consumer credit freezes, which would
not be expected to affect corporate data breach reporting. These regression results do not
provide evidence for the efficacy of the intervention as β6, which indicates a post-treatment
level change is not statistically significant.
5.4.2 Comparing New York Finance to Finance Elsewhere with Maine Data
The more useful of the two quasi-experiments compares New York finance to all other fi-
nance incidents. Looking at Figure 5.8, we see that financial incidents went up significantly
from late 2016 to early 2018.1
As a result of this precipitous increase in the number of reported financial incidents
nationally and the comparative flatness of reports from the state of New York, there is a
statistically significant level change between the treatment and control populations shown
in Table 5.4. The model estimates this difference to be 3.55 incidents per month post-
intervention compared to 1.11 incidents per month pre-intervention. This level change in
the model β6 works in conjunction with β2, which shows statistical significance (0.001
probability) that the level of the control rises by four incidents per month.
5.4.3 Comparing New York Finance to Finance Elsewhere with Connecticut Data
There are some concerns with using Maine data to estimate New York regulatory efficacy.
Of particular concern is that the lack of reported incidents might indicate that Maine resi-
dents lack close customer relationships with major New York financial firms. Ultimately,
1Given its significant role in finance, what proportion of financial breaches might we expect New York
to occupy? If proportional to labor, and employment can serve as a proxy, the New York Department of
Labor (,2021) estimated 510.4 thousand New Yorkers were employed in Finance and Insurance (NAICS 52)
in contrast, the United States Bureau of Labor estimates 6.28 Million were employed nationally in January of
2018 (Employment by Major Industry Sector 2020). So at a minimum, one might expect 8% of incidents to
be reported out of New York, which would have entailed two incidents in 2017. This, of course, ignores other
important proxies like geographic proximity and the unique role played by the New York financial sector.
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s New York Finance*
Not-New York Finance**
Table 5.4: Comparative ITS NY DFS Regulations (NY Finance Compared to Non-NY
Finance) with Maine Data
Parameter Interpretation Estimate Std Error Probability
α Intercept 1.11 0.81 0.18
β1 Control Pre-Trend −0.02 0.16 0.88
β2 Control Post-Level 4.05 1.05 0.00 ***
Change
β3 Control Post-Trend 0.23 0.23 0.34
Change
β4 Treatment/Control −1.11 1.14 0.34
Pre-Level Difference
β5 Treatment/Control 0.02 0.23 0.92
Pre-Trend Difference
β6 Treatment/Control −3.55 1.48 0.02 *
Post-Level Difference
β7 Treatment/Control Change −0.31 0.31 0.34
in Slope Difference Pre-to Post-
Maine was selected because it included detailed address information for most companies
affected, which allowed me to positively verify whether companies were headquartered in
New York, and their associated industry. Connecticut is the only other reporting state that
provided information on the location of the affected company with a category for ’State’
and requests a description of the industry of the affected party. Of the 4369 incidents
reported to Connecticut in the period between 2016 and 2019, 2708 include an industry
identifier (61% of reported incidents). Consequently, rather than classifying the industry
based on a query of the firm’s name, I used the self-designated industry to search for a cor-
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responding NAICS number. This coding exercise identified 872 of the 914 unique names or
95.4% of them. Ultimately, this left me with a sample of 2,050 industry collected incidents
from the state of Connecticut.






















































































s New York Finance*
Not-New York Finance**
Table 5.5: Comparative ITS NY DFS Regulations (NY Finance Compared to NY Not-
Finance with Connecticut Data)
Parameter Interpretation Estimate Std Error Probability
α Intercept 3.97 2.68 0.15
β1 Control Pre-Trend −0.10 0.36 0.79
β2 Control Post-Level 9.66 3.57 0.01 *
Change
β3 Control Post-Trend −0.32 0.51 0.54
Change
β4 Treatment/Control −4.17 3.79 0.28
Pre-Level Difference
β5 Treatment/Control 0.23 0.51 0.66
Pre-Trend Difference
β6 Treatment/Control −9.51 5.05 0.07 .
Post-Level Difference
β7 Treatment/Control Change 0.26 0.73 0.73
in Slope Difference Pre-to Post-
Figure 5.9 shows a similar trend to that observed in Figure 5.8. New York financial in-
cidents remain relatively flat with a modest increase between the pre and post-intervention
levels. In contrast, with the control, national financial incidents spiked in July of 2018,
rising on average by approximately ten incidents per month from pre-treatment levels. As
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there were no corresponding restrictions, and to increase the statistical power of the model,
the Connecticut analysis used 12 months pre and post-treatment to evaluate efficacy. Look-
ing at the regression results in Table 5.5 shows statistical significance for both β2 and β6, as
was observed previously in Table 5.4. However, the strength of this statistical significance
is weakened, as β2, the post-level change of control, shows only a .05 probability. While,
β6, the post-level difference between treatment and control is weakly significant with .10
probability. Further the magnitude of this change is even more significant than in the prior
model. The estimate of β6 shows a difference of 9.51 incidents per month post-treatment.
This level difference between β6 and β4 of 5.34 incidents per month is the effect of the
regulation. The magnitude of this difference would suggest that even a smaller effect size
would be a notable outcome for the regulation.
Unlike with the prior Maine quasi-experiment, the use of Connecticut data avoids the
issues associated with a lack of geographical proximity or an insufficient number of cases
pre and post-intervention to characterize the policy’s effect adequately. While weakened,
the statistical significance of this second finding still serves to validate this prior finding.
The implications of the finding is discussed in greater depth in the next chapter.
5.4.4 Robustness Checks
There are three variants of robustness checks that were attempted on the Connecticut data.
These included 1) switching the incident dating to the earliest reported date (most fre-
quently the date of the breach), 2) changing the binning frequency from months to weeks,
and 3) changing the period of pre and post-collection from 12 months to eight months. The
first of these three robustness checks confirmed the initial finding, while the other two did
not replicate the initial finding. This mixed replication suggests a sensitivity in the analysis
that may or may not relate to the objective findings. Instead, the mixed performance of
the robustness checks could be a product of the changes in measurement not being appro-
priate. An alternative explanation for the change in binning could be a product of too few
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observable incidents. When the data is limited to just reporting from one state and just
within one sector, binning by weeks produces more variable data, and consequently, more
observations show zero incidents. As demonstrated by Figure 5.9, the time-series shows a
drop in national financial incidents observed in September thru December 2018 and a spike
in January and February of 2019. When an eight-month rather than 12 month period is
observed, the latter spike is excluded, and the significance of the model is lost.
Figure 5.10: Comparing New York Finance to Not-New York Finance with Connecticut






















































































s New York Finance*
Not-New York Finance**
Table 5.6: Comparative ITS NY DFS Regulations (NY Finance Compared to NY Not-
Finance, Connecticut Robustness Check)
Parameter Interpretation Estimate Std Error Probability
α Intercept 4.05 1.40 0.01 **
β1 Control Pre-Trend 0.00 0.19 0.97
β2 Control Post-Level 5.07 1.87 0.01 **
Change
β3 Control Post-Trend 0.03 0.27 0.92
Change
β4 Treatment/Control −4.44 1.98 0.03 *
Pre-Level Difference
β5 Treatment/Control 0.27 0.27 0.31
Pre-Trend Difference
β6 Treatment/Control −6.68 2.65 0.02 *
Post-Level Difference
β7 Treatment/Control Change −0.16 0.38 0.66
in Slope Difference Pre-to Post-
However, the initial statistical findings in Connecticut were improved on by selecting
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the first reported date associated with each incident. For approximately 80% of the Con-
necticut data, this earliest date would be the initial date of the breach. If, as modeled earlier,
we assume that the efficacy of the regulations would be to reduce the initial occurrence of a
breach, this date would serve as a more effective proxy for the security of covered organi-
zations. Unfortunately, the date of the breach is not required for submission by Connecticut
and is rarely collected by other states. Additional dates preceding the reported date include
the submission date (Connecticut distinguishes between when a breach is submitted into
their system and the date the report was submitted to the Office) and the date the breach
ended. By switching to the first available date, the finding is replicated for the year before
and after implementation. These new findings shown in Table 5.6 demonstrate meaningful
statistical significance of the post-treatment level change at the 95% confidence level, how-
ever a weaker estimate of β6 at -6.68. If we subtract β4 the pre-level difference from β6 the
post-level difference, this provides an effect size of 2.24 incidents per month.
5.5 Massachusetts Data Security Law
In this second case, we assess the efficacy of the Massachusetts Data Security Law, promul-
gated as “201 CMR 17: Standards for the protection of personal information of residents of
the Commonwealth.” With a November 2009 implementation date, the Massachusetts Data
Security Law was the earliest state-level cybersecurity regulation to be implemented.There
are only two promising quasi-experimental state comparisons with this early implementa-
tion: New Hampshire and North Carolina. New Hampshire required reporting all incidents,
regardless of residents affected, in the eight months prior and post to 201 CMR 17’s imple-
mentation period. North Carolina, in contrast, only required reporting of incidents where
1000 residents were affected at the beginning of the implementation period and subse-
quently changed their data breach security law to require more extensive reporting.
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5.5.1 Comparison with New Hampshire
Having normalized the number of reported breaches per million for Massachusetts and New
Hampshire, we can compare the eight months before implementation (April - Sept 2008)
with the eight months after implementation (March - August 2010). From Figure 5.11, we
can see a remarkable amount of overlap in the incident frequency between the two states.












































































Comparing the incident frequency of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, the two states
seem to track with each other before, during, and after implementing the regulations (this
is the period between the regulations enactment and their enforcement). Visual observation
seems to suggest a slight drop in the number of breach incidents during this period. While
β1 shows a negative coefficient, this is not statistically significant. Neither are any of the
other parameters specified in Table 5.7. Breaches per million residents between the two
states average to approximately five incidents per month. The mean of the incidents during
the selected period for Massachusetts is 4.48, while the mean for New Hampshire is 5.6.
Massachusetts exhibits less variation with a standard deviation of 1.20, while New Hamp-
shire exhibits more with a standard deviation of 2.52. This increased variation may be a
result of New Hampshire’s smaller underlying population size presenting a smaller sample.
An important caveat in this particular case study is that the proximity of New Hamp-
79
shire to the state of Massachusetts would increase the likelihood that corporations would
have Massachusetts residents as customers. Statistically, this would result in contamina-
tion of the non-equivalent control group through procedural confounding. We can partially
measure the potential risk posed for New Hampshire firms complying with Massachusetts
regulations by looking at the overlap of incidents reported by both states. Having per-
formed incident matching using corporate names, we can measure the degree of overlap
shown in Figure 5.12. While this co-occurrence is reasonably small for Massachusetts at
13.3% of that state’s incidents during this period, it is relatively large for New Hampshire,
with 53.8% of its incidents overlapping.
Figure 5.12: Co-occurrence of Breach Incidents in Massachusetts and New Hampshire
Not in New Hampshire Yes, in New Hampshire
Not in Massachusetts 188 103
Yes, in Massachusetts 684 103
Intuitions about the lack of statistical difference made by the Massachusetts Data Secu-
rity Law policy are confirmed by a comparative interrupted time-series result. Of specific
interest is β7, which marks a change in pre and post-implementation.
Table 5.7: Comparative ITS Massachusetts Data Security Law vs. New Hampshire
Parameter Interpretation Estimate Std Error Probability
α Intercept 7.09 1.34 0.00***
β1 Control Pre-Trend −0.18 0.26 0.50
β2 Control Post-Level −0.91 1.73 0.60
Change
β3 Control Post-Trend 0.33 0.37 0.38
Change
β4 Treatment/Control −3.03 1.89 0.12
Pre-Level Difference
β5 Treatment/Control 0.23 0.37 0.55
Pre-Trend Difference
β6 Treatment/Control 1.57 2.45 0.53
Post-Level Difference
β7 Treatment/Control Change −0.57 0.53 0.29
in Slope Difference Pre-to Post-
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5.5.2 Comparison with North Carolina
Transitioning to the second quasi-experiment that can be run on Massachusetts employs the
breach data reported by North Carolina. As previously mentioned, to employ this quasi-
experiment required that the two states be subset to just look at incidents affecting 1000+
residents. This scoping allows us to effectively ignore the change of North Carolina’s
amendment to its data breach reporting legislation. This legislation titled either Session
Law 2009-355 or Senate Bill 1017 amended Section 2. G.S. §75-65 on Protection from
security breaches. This section was only amended by 1) changing the amount of infor-
mation that those affected by data breaches were required to share and 2) the removal of
the threshold for reporting (An Act to Enhance Protections Against Identity Theft and to
Protect the Credit of Crime Victims Compensation Fund Applications and Appeals, 2021).
When focusing on just prominent incidents, those affecting over 1000 residents, there
is no population effect. That suggests that we would not expect the size of the population
to serve a significant role in the number of reported incidents. This can be demonstrated by
looking at the raw incident counts in Figure 5.13, which show significant overlap between
the two states despite the 2010 population of North Carolina at 9.5 million being almost
46% larger than the 6.5 million population of Massachusetts.








































































Figure 5.14: Co-occurrence of Large Breach Incidents (+1000 residents affected) in MA
and NC
Not in North Carolina Yes, in North Carolina
Not in Massachusetts 56
Yes, in Massachusetts 65 13
Similar to the prior case study, we can evaluate whether these major national incidents
were concurrently reported in both states. Surprisingly, most larger incidents did not appear
to have been reported in both states (at least not concurrently). Only 13 of the 134 incidents
affecting 1000+ residents in one of the two states were reported to both.
Table 5.8: Comparative ITS Massachusetts Data Security Law vs. North Carolina for Large
Incidents
Parameter Interpretation Estimate Std Error Probability
α Intercept 1.79 0.88 0.5 .
β1 Control Pre-Trend 0.13 0.17 0.46
β2 Control Post-Level −0.73 1.14 0.53
Change
β3 Control Post-Trend −0.24 0.25 0.34
Change
β4 Treatment/Control −0.18 1.24 0.89
Pre-Level Difference
β5 Treatment/Control 0.01 0.25 0.96
Pre-Trend Difference
β6 Treatment/Control 0.08 1.61 0.96
Post-Level Difference
β7 Treatment/Control Change −0.01 0.35 0.97
in Slope Difference Pre-to Post-
The visual overlap between Massachusetts and North Carolina is confirmed with regres-
sion results that show no statistically significant change for any of the ITS variables except
the intercept. The intercept is only weakly statistically significant at the 90% confidence
level indicating an average of 1.79 incidents per month.
5.6 HITECH Act
Switching to the third case study, on the effect of the HITECH Act, all incidents from all
collecting states through the year 2010 were coded for industry using Mergent Intellect by
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FTSE Russell. This data source includes access to the D&B MDDI, which can be used to
look up DUNS codes corresponding to each company manually. The DUNS codes allowed
for the exporting of corporate metadata, which included NAICS codes. NAICS code 62
corresponds to the Health Care and Social Assistance sector, and NAICS code 52 corre-
sponds to the Finance and Insurance sector. I consequently produce two quasi-experiments;
the first is a comparative ITS where the health sector is contrasted with all other industries.
In the second quasi-experiment, the health sector is compared to the finance industry.
5.6.1 Heath and Non-Health
The following chart shows the rate of change of incident frequency between the healthcare
sector and all other sectors over the collection years that were coded for industry. Notably,
the health sector appears to represent about 10% of breach incidents during the collection
period. This ratio seems to correspond with what one would expect based on the size of
that industry; US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2020) estimates suggest that 11.5 percent of
jobs nationally were in the health care sector.
Subsetting this data to the relevant years, the collection period would start in the eight
months before enacting the regulations (February 17, 2009) and the eight months following
the enforcement of the regulations (May 27, 2009). This date range is simplified to August
2008 - November 2009.
Comparing health industry to non-health industry breaches, we see a statistically sig-
nificant difference between treatment and control with β4. This finding is intuitive, as the
population of all non-health-related incidents would be significantly greater than health in-
cidents, in this case approximately 26 fewer healthcare incidents than all other incidents.
There is also a significant effect in β2, which shows a drop of approximately 18 incidents
for the control between the pre-period and the post-period. However, there was no relative
change in slope or level between the treatment and control populations. In other words,
there was not a statistically significant change in breach reporting in the health care indus-
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Figure 5.15: HITECH Act: Health and Non-Health Coding













































try following the implementation of the HITECH Act.
5.6.2 Heath and Finance
The finance industry was identified as another potential control population as it represents
a large portion of the overall number of incidents and has industry-specific regulations re-
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Table 5.9: Comparative ITS HITECH Act (Health Sector Compared to All Other Sectors)
Parameter Interpretation Estimate Std Error Probability
α Intercept 28.46 5.58 0.00 ***
β1 Control Pre-Trend 1.20 1.10 0.29
β2 Control Post-Level −18.19 7.24 0.02 *
Change
β3 Control Post-Trend 1.07 1.56 0.50
Change
β4 Treatment/Control −26.25 7.88 0.00 **
Pre-Level Difference
β5 Treatment/Control −0.75 1.56 0.64
Pre-Trend Difference
β6 Treatment/Control 15.68 10.24 0.14
Post-Level Difference
β7 Treatment/Control Change −1.51 2.21 0.50
in Slope Difference Pre-to Post-
quiring that it protect the privacy of its consumers (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999).
Further, much of the more significant cybersecurity-relevant regulations affecting this in-
dustry would happen outside of the years captured (2008-2009). As mentioned above, the
coding for these incidents reflects industry NAICS codes as an appropriate proxy. Where 62
covers the Health Care and Social Assistance sector and 52 covers Finance and Insurance.
The frequency of incidents for the corresponding eight months prior and post to the in-
tervention shows that Finance has approximately three times as many reported data breaches
as the health care sector during the covered dates. Visually, it is hard to tell whether the
change is significant, but it does appear like there may be a modest increase in incident fre-
quency in the finance sector and a decrease in the healthcare sector in the months following
the regulatory intervention.
However, when evaluated with the regression in Table 5.10, there is no statistically
significant change in the differences of level or slope for the treatment (Health) and control
(Finance) sector. Instead, statistical significance is found with time β1, with an increase
of 7.7 incidents per month for pre-treatment control. Significance is also found in β2, the
difference between control pre-treatment and the control post-treatment, with a level drop
of 12.7 incidents. With no statistical significance for β6 and β7, we can infer that the
HITECH Act did not meaningfully change the level of incidents reported to the health care
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Figure 5.17: Comparing Health vs. Finance Breaches
















Table 5.10: Comparative ITS HITECH Act (Health Sector Compared to All Other Sectors)
Parameter Interpretation Estimate Std Error Probability
α Intercept 7.71 3.72 0.05 *
β1 Control Pre-Trend 1.79 0.74 0.02 *
β2 Control Post-Level −12.71 4.83 0.01 *
Change
β3 Control Post-Trend −0.65 1.04 0.54
Change
β4 Treatment/Control −5.50 5.26 0.31
Pre-Level Difference
β5 Treatment/Control −1.33 1.04 0.21
Pre-Trend Difference
β6 Treatment/Control 10.20 6.83 0.15
Post-Level Difference
β7 Treatment/Control Change 0.21 1.47 0.89
in Slope Difference Pre-to Post-
sector.
5.7 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Enforcement
In the case of the FTC’s Wyndham Hotels lawsuit, a potentially fruitful quasi-experiment is
produced across all states and sectors of the economy. The case was seen as an expansive
extension of FTC oversight, particularly concerning PCI DSS compliance, the Payment
Card Industry Data Security Standards, as well as extending potential cybersecurity lia-
bility from franchisors to their franchisees. This broad jurisdictional effect and the media
attention of the incident could reasonably have shifted the curve. However, a look at the
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Figure 5.18: Frequency of Breaches Across Seven States, Seasonally Adjusted
overall frequency of incidents from those states collecting during the period immediately
preceding the Wyndham case (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, California,
South Carolina, Hawaii, and Iowa) shows that the growth rate followed a macro level linear
trend line from 2010 through 2017, with significant variance from month to month.
A subsample of aggregated incidents was complied based on whether they showed a
dummy variable indicating a record in one of the aforementioned states. For purposes of
regression analysis and to make this case consistent with the methods employed in other
cases, the data was re-scaled to reflect incident frequency per population. However, as
population rates of change were relatively low in the sample states and the pre and post-
treatment aggregates were from the same sample population. This did not dramatically
change the appearance of the above graph; however, it does change the scale such that in-
cident frequency in 2012-2013 hovered around one breach per million residents per month
in aggregate for the selected states.
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5.7.1 FTC Complaint
Figure 5.19: The Wyndham FTC Complaint as Intervention














Subsetting the data to the relevant dates around the Wyndham case as shown in Fig-
ure 5.19, the eight months preceding the suit showed a generally positive trend line while
the following eight months seem to drop before rising in the final two months. This trend
demonstrates a particular challenge with this kind of stochastic data set, as drawing infer-
ence from the prior six months would fail to capture this October and November growth.
Running a regression on these results, as shown in Table 5.11, shows weak statisti-
cal significance in β1 for a pre-intervention growth trend of .15 incidents per Million per
month with a 90% confidence score. While the coefficient for β2 is negative and would
consequently suggest some evidence for a drop in incident reports in the months immedi-
ately following, this is not shown to be statistically significant. It may be possible with a
smaller unit of analysis, such as with weeks and a different reporting window, to demon-
strate statistical significance. However, as specified, there is no indication that the FTC’s
Wyndham suit reduced breach reports in the subsequent eight months.
5.7.2 Third Circuit Decision
This first time-series and regression define the intervention as the initial complaint which
the FTC directed against Wyndham Hotels. Alternatively, one could focus on the effect of
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Table 5.11: Quasi-Experiment for Wyndham FTC Suit (FTC Complaint)
Parameter Interpretation Estimate Std Error Probability
α Intercept 1.74 0.40 0.00 ***
β1 Pre-Trend 0.15 0.08 0.09 .
β2 Post-Level −0.82 0.52 0.14
Change
β3 Post-Trend −0.06 0.11 0.62
Change
Wyndham’s motion to dismiss and subsequent appeal, which put the authority of the FTC
in these matters into doubt. The subsequent decision by the Third Circuit Court (August 24,
2015), which confirmed the FTC’s authority and the ultimate decision by Wyndham Hotel
to settle (December 9, 2015), serves as dates that present another reasonable intervention.
The difference-in-difference for this intervention shows a net increase rather than a decrease
in the level of reported Breaches per capita from the targeted states.





















































This alternative time-series produces a distinct set of regression results, which show
statistical significance in the increase of breaches post-treatment; however, it suggests a
negative slope of the frequency of breaches in the eight months following the intervention.
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Table 5.12: Quasi-Experiment for Wyndham FTC Suit (Third Circuit Decision)
Parameter Interpretation Estimate Std Error Probability
α Intercept 3.16 0.67 0.00 ***
β1 Pre-Trend 0.06 0.13 0.68
β2 Post-Level 2.28 0.87 0.02 *
Change
β3 Post-Trend −0.34 0.19 0.09 .
Change
5.8 Statistical Verification
Assumed in statistical time-series analysis is that monthly incident accounts are stationary
time-series and that the incidents are sufficiently stochastic that one can ignore the possibil-
ity of auto-correlation or seasonal auto-regressive terms. The presence of autocorrelation
can be demonstrated visually with a plot produced by Auto- and Cross- Covariance and
-Correlation Functions as well as with Partial Autocorrelation Functions. The time-series
data can also be tested as stationary (i.e., the statistical properties of a time-series such as
mean, standard errors, and autocorrelation do not change over time). One such test is the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests.
Time-series employed in the quasi-experiments were tested for both autocorrelation and
partial autocorrelation. These charts are provided in the Appendix in Figure C.1 through
Figure C.12. The ACF and PACF plots for incident frequency provided in the Appendix
demonstrate that most of the spikes were not statistically significant. While occasionally
trend spikes that dropped above or below a 95% confidence interval, consequently, the plots




This research is the first quasi-experimental policy evaluation of information security regu-
lations to identify a cybersecurity reform that meaningfully reduces breaches. That said, in
three of the four case studies developed for this research, statistically significant evidence
of a reduction in breaches was not observed. Why was this case? What attributes about
the NY DFS regulations made this activity seemingly more efficacious? This chapter will
explore the potential impact of spatial and temporal factors discussed in section 5.3. The
chapter’s core will then address comparative questions between the four cases, developing
hypotheses that might explain these observations. This chapter will also investigate the
magnitude and duration of the NY DFS regulatory interventions’ efficacy. Finally, it will
provide some recommendations for future research and policy development that draws on
these findings.
6.1 Impact of Spatial and Temporal Factors
Two findings from section 5.3 are particularly worthy of policy consideration. Preliminary
evidence for localization and seasonality present promising topics for future research and
valuable knowledge for businesses and policy entrepreneurs alike.
Given that breach reporting seems to spike around March and dips in November, how
could businesses use this information to their advantage. If the cause of this seasonal
increase (likely instigated by breaches that occurred in prior months) can be identified and
isolated, then training materials could be aligned with their seasonal cause. Once linked to
the holidays or the end of the fiscal year, employees could be warned of potentially timely
fraud schemes, phishing attacks, or theft of devices. Even without identifying a cause,
seasonal security hires might enable some firms to prepare for the worst.
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The localization of breach incidents presents a separate set of policy expectations. If
most breaches are not national in scope, perhaps the incidents are linked to smaller firms
or localized branches with a local customer base. What resources do these firms need to
adequately respond to more minor incidents? How can the costs of compliance be low-
ered? Perhaps states could employ online forms that export notification letter so that small
businesses would not need to rely on lawyers to faciliate reporting. The Department of
Homeland Security and the National Institute of Standards and Technology could develop
more resources targeted at a lower level of cyber maturity. Localization also suggests that
state-level interventions targeted at in-state firms (like the NY DFS regulations) may be
more impactful on total breaches than one might anticipate.
6.2 Comparing Cyber Regulatory Efforts
There are four different aspects to the regulatory interventions that can be compared, their
scope, substance, implementation period, and penalties. Across these four aspects, the
NY DFS designed a unique structure for their cybersecurity regulations which is highly
targeted, carries substantive measures, employs staged implementation phases, and uses a
novel penalty structure. While I can not with the current results show a specific relationship
between these measures and a change in efficacy, they present valuable guidelines for how
future regulations might be structured and the dimensions regulators might experiment with
to create new policy designs.
6.2.1 Policy Scope
While discussed in greater depth in chapter 3, I designed the structure for the case se-
lection to include four quasi-experiments employing combinations of industry and state
coverage. The degree of coverage for each case consequently varies. The Massachusetts
Data Security Law affects any company with PII data covering residents of the state. The
cybersecurity regulations in the HITECH Act apply to the handling of PHI. PHI is defined
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by 45 CFR § 160.103 as ‘individually identifiable health information.’ The FTC’s Section
5 enforcement capability is nationally relevant across all industries and allows it to target
any company that has failed to reasonably protect consumers’ information. In contrast, the
NY DFS targeted its cybersecurity provisions at regulated entities and licensed persons in
the financial services and insurance sector for the state of New York.
This scoping issue becomes relevant if different affected populations vary in their com-
pliance with the regulatory change. For example, the financial services sector presents an
already heavily regulated industry that is likely to be more capable of effectively complying
with new regulations than other sectors. Similarly, the health care sector is representative
of a regulated sector capable of implementing new compliance measures. In contrast, the
Massachusetts Law and FTC Section 5 enforcement cover all industries and consequently
include lightly regulated business sectors, including companies less likely to track and
comport with new regulations. Accordingly, the regulatory responsiveness of the covered
population may serve as a moderating variable that could reduce the efficacy and potentially
the statistical significance of analysis when viewed across all sectors.
6.2.2 Contents of Regulations
Perhaps most significantly, there are fundamental differences between these policies in
what they require of organizations to comply. Of the four regulatory interventions, each
employs a unique policy design, though often covering overlapping topics. This topical
coverage can be compared across each intervention, including organizational requirements
(Table 6.1) and computer security requirements (Table 6.2). The following tables iden-
tify whether the language in the four regulatory interventions addresses specific regulatory
requirements, coded as either ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ However, as the FTC’s complaint against Wyn-
dham is a case rather than new regulation, the additional context of ‘(not new)’ is appended
to ‘yes’ to differentiate where previous FTC actions had covered the same ground. In the
following paragraphs, I discuss each intervention’s topical coverage in turn.
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Table 6.1: Organizational Regulatory Requirements
MA Data





Designation of specific personnel Yes Yes No Yes
Education and training of employees Yes Yes No Yes
Creation and maintenance of
cyber policies Yes Yes No Yes
Notification of Breaches Yes Yes No Yes
Certification of compliance No No No Yes
Table 6.2: Computer Security Requirements
MA Data





Secure user authentication protocols Yes Yes Yes (not new) Yes
Secure access control measures Yes Yes Yes (not new) Yes
Encryption requirements Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reasonably up-to-date security
software, patches, virus definitions Yes Yes Yes (not new) Yes
Control third-party access to network Yes Yes Yes Yes
The substance of the Massachusetts Data Security Law includes both provisions written
into the law and the regulations mandated by OCABR that were instigated by the law. Nec-
essary for the quasi-experimental design, the law contained a requirement for state-level
breach notification (M.G.L. § 93H-1 et seq.) with the earliest reports submitted in Novem-
ber and December of 2007. OCABR only passed the regulations instigated by the law (201
C.M.R. 17.00, et. seq) in September of 2008. Consequently, the quasi-experiment was
made possible because a breach reporting requirement was already in effect in the months
preceding OCABR’s implementation of new regulations. The corresponding regulatory
language that addresses each category is cited here:
• Designation of specific personnel (201 CMR 17.00: Standards for the Protection of
Personal Information of Residents of the Commonwealth, 2020, 201 CMR 17.03.2a)
• Education and training of employees (201 CMR 17.03.2b1)
• Creation and maintenance of cyber policies (201 CMR 17.03.1)
• Notification of breaches (MGLA 93H § 3(a)) (Regulations to Safeguard Personal
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Information of Commonwealth Residents, 2020)
• Secure user authentication protocols (201 CMR 17.00: Standards for the Protection
of Personal Information of Residents of the Commonwealth, 2020, 201 CMR 17.04.1)
• Secure access control measures (201 CMR 17.04.2)
• Encryption Requirements (201 CMR 17.04.3 and 17.04.5)
• Reasonably up-to-date security software, patches, virus definitions (201 CMR 17.04.7)
• Control third-party access to network (201 CMR 17.03.2f)
HIPAA’s Security Rule discussed in section 3.2 had since 2003 established adminis-
trative and technical regulations affecting cybersecurity. Consequently, while not directly
addressed in the HITECH Act legislation or regulation, the expansion of HIPAA rules to
covered entities addresses a wide range of organizational and computer security require-
ments. Like the Massachusetts Data Security Law, the HITECH Act’s notification of breach
requirements led to the earliest report being submitted in October of 2009, while the reg-
ulation itself was not implemented until March 1, 2010. The corresponding regulatory
language for each category is cited here:
Organizational Regulatory Requirements
• Designation of specific personnel (Federal Register 2003, 45 CFR § 164.308(a)(2)))
• Education and training of employees (45 CFR § 164.308(a)(5)(i))
• Creation and maintenance of cyber policies (45 CFR § 164.308(a)(1)(i))
• Notification of breaches (Federal Register 2009, 45 CFR § 164.408)
Computer Security Requirements
• Secure user authentication protocols (Federal Register 2003, 45 CFR § 164.312(d))
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• Secure access control measures (Federal Register 2003, 45 CFR § 164.312(a)(1))
• Encryption Requirements (45 CFR §164.312(e)(1))
• Reasonably up-to-date security software, patches, virus definitions (45 CFR § 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(A))
• Control third-party access to network (45 CFR § 164.314.2)
While the Wyndham Hotel case is remembered for its subsequent litigation, it expanded
on prior FTC precedent. The FTC had previously employed its Section 5(a) enforcement
powers before its complaint against Wyndham Hotel. For example, looking at an earlier
August 2008 complaint against TJ Max shows that the complaint covered similar issues
to those of the Wyndham case: including failing to authenticate users, adequately restrict
network access, left PII in plain text, and did not update their systems. Given that the
FTC complaint resembled prior cases, the intervention should be understood as limited to
topics not previously addressed. Novel content issues covered by the complaint include the
role of the Payment Card Industry (PCI) encryption standard and an expansion of third-
party access requirements covering subsidiaries. As described above, the appending of
(not new) was added to content categories addressed in prior complaints to clarify this
distinction. As the complaint is not a regulation, the regulation categories are matched to
sections in the complaint enumerated as “Defendants’ Inadequate Data Security Practices.”
The assessment of inadequacy seems to imply the FTC’s authority over these substantive
domains.
• Secure user authentication protocols (FTC vs Wyndham Worldwide Corporation First
Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief 2012, 24(h))
• Secure access control measures (24(a))
• Encryption Requirements (24(b))
• Reasonably up-to-date security software, patches, virus definitions (24(d))
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• Control third-party access to network (FTC vs Wyndham Worldwide Corporation
First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief 2012, 24(j))
The NY DFS directly expanded new regulations under 23 NYCRR 500. This regulatory
expansion included new notification of breach requirements to the Superintendent of Finan-
cial Services. However, this additional regulation need not be treated separately from the
core intervention, as was the case in the Massachusetts Data Security Law or the HITECH
Act, as alternative pre-existing notification requirements in other jurisdictions were already
in place. References to the corresponding policy language are cited here:
Organizational Regulatory Requirements
• Designation of specific personnel (Vullo 2017, Section 500.10)
• Education and training of employees (Section 500.14)
• Creation and maintenance of cyber policies (Section 500.03)
• Notification of breaches (Section 500.17)
Computer Security Requirements
• Secure user authentication protocols (Section 500.14(a))
• Secure access control measures (Section 500.12(b))
• Encryption Requirements (Section 500.15)
• Reasonably up-to-date security software, patches,
virus definitions (Section 500.05)
• Control third-party access to network (Section 500.11)
The content of these regulatory interventions demonstrates that all four regulations seek
to establish standards on similar topics. However, simply demonstrating coverage does not
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suggest the degree of cyber maturity required. For example, while the FTC’s complaint
against Wyndham highlights simple passwords reused for both usernames and passwords,
the NY DFS regulations require dual-authentication. The FTC’s authority, as demonstrated
by the Wyndham case, seems the most different from the others as its complaint was lim-
ited in scope to technical rather than organizational best practices. Perhaps uniquely, the
NY DFS regulations require a certification of compliance with the Superintendent. This
suggests that the NY DFS regulations are more extensive in their requirements than the
other three interventions.
6.2.3 Implementation Period
Within the policy process literature, ‘implementation’ follows policy ‘selection’ (Brewer
1974). Consequently, in both the Massachusetts Data Security Law and the HITECH Act,
the passage of the legislation was only one step. The regulatory process that followed
involved propagating rules, collecting feedback, and setting an ultimate date for enforce-
ment. Complex regulatory changes require time for the regulated business sector to adapt.
Cybersecurity regulations that require changes to corporate policy, purchasing solutions,
and employee training are particularly complex. The period of implementation modeled
below in Figure 6.1 measures the number of days for compliance between the propagation
of proposed rules and their enforcement dates.
The Massachusetts Data Security Law had a single deadline for compliance. While
the initial legislation passed on August 3, 2007, the final regulations were not filed by
OCABR until September 22, 2008. These regulations were initially expected to require
compliance on January 1, 2009, but were extended on three separate occasions, ultimately
becoming effective on March 1, 2010. The first of these extensions was justified “in light
of intervening economic circumstances” (Brenner 2008). An interim May 1 deadline was
considered by OCABR to be in line with the FTC’s Red Flag Rule. The regulations were
also modified on August 17, 2009, to reflect a more risk-based and technology-neutral
98
approach. Ultimately, businesses were left with 525 days to achieve compliance.
Congress signed the HITECH Act on February 17, 2009. Regulations covering the
Section D cybersecurity components were first published on April 27, 2009. The interim
final rule became effective on November 30, 2009. In total, this includes just 286 days
for companies to prepare for compliance. There were separate deadlines for compliance
with the breach reporting requirements to the HHS Secretary, which went into effect on
September 23, 2009 (Civil Rights 2009).
NY DFS designed the regulation to be implemented in stages. The initial rules were
drafted in September 2016 and open for comments through December 28, 2016. These
initial rules assumed that companies would have a transitional period to prepare for com-
pliance. Covered entities would be given 180 days from the effective date to prepare. A
two-month delay pushed the initial January 1st effective date to March 1, 2017. After the
rules became effective, certification with the state was not required until February 15, 2018.
Combined, this extended out compliance for covered business by a year, ultimately leaving
351 days between formalizing the rules (their effective date) and their final enforcement
through certification. This date range was selected for the quasi-experiments, as the earlier
propagated rules were modified. Two additional deadlines would follow this initial certi-
fication. Compliance with monitoring and encryption requirements was initially estimated
to take 18 months, and third-party service requirements were expected to take two years.
Identifying implementation dates to use as part of the quasi-experiments requires some
degree of interpretive evaluation. Should one initiate the quasi-experiment upon the date
legislation is passed, when regulations are drafted, or when regulations come into effect?
Critically, this period presents an opportunity for businesses to come into compliance. If
this period was too short, we might expect the effects of the regulation to not be observable
until many months later. If the implementation phase is too long, some of these changes
could become subject to broader trends affecting the relevant states or industries.
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Figure 6.1: Implementation Days












In the policy process literature, the implementation phase extends beyond the date of en-
forcement to enforcement actions themselves. These enforcement actions serve in some
ways as additional quasi-experiments, moments where companies’ sense of regulatory
risk adjusts to new realities. However, the magnitude of penalties regulators can assign
to would-be violators is frequently constrained under the law. These maximum limits on
penalties provide the private sector with information that informs a regulatory risk assess-
ment. When fines are constrained, the costs of non-compliance are more acceptable. The
four cases identified in this research assign various maximum penalties described in the
following list and graphed in Figure 6.2.
• MA Data Security Law Penalties have a maximum limit per violation of $5,000
• HITECH Act Penalties are limited per violation at $100 to $50,000.
• NY DFS regulations Penalties have a maximum limit per day of $2,500 (any-violation)
$15,000 (negligence) $75,000 (knowing)
• FTC Enforcement Penalties have a maximum limit per violation of $16,000 (pre-
2016) $40,000 (post-2016)
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A review of the regulatory costs shows that the NY DFS regulations have a higher
penalty than either of the three other cases. However, this compares non-equivalent units, as
the NY DFS regulations have penalties that are limited per day, where the other three have
penalties that are limited per violation. Further, the NY DFS regulations are more tiered
than those demonstrated in the other three laws. The distinction between any violation,
negligence and a knowing violation pre-determines how the regulator will penalize would-
be violators.
Comparing early regulatory enforcement (discussed in greater depth in chapter 3), the
first enforcement action by Massachusetts was against the Briar Group, and the first settle-
ment following the HITECH Act was with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee. While not
the first penalty for violating the NY DFS cybersecurity regulations, the first payment was
made as part of a settlement by Residential Mortgage Inc. Comparing these three penalties
for non-compliance (see Table 6.3), it is notable that none occurred within the first year of
enforcement. However, these incidents occurred several years before they were settled. The
timing of these enforcement actions means that while compliance in the first year follow-
ing implementation may matter, companies would not know how aggressive the regulatory
agency would be until much later. As for the magnitude of the penalties, proportionate to
the incident, it does appear that the Massachusetts Data Security Law is the least severe,
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and the NY DFS regulations are the most severe.
Table 6.3: First Regulatory Enforcement
State Law
Massachusetts Data



















Penalty $110,000 $1,500,000 $1,500,000
Days Since Regulation
Has Been Enforced 372 days 1,017 days 1,112 days
6.3 Estimating Savings from NY DFS Regulations
In the prior findings section, the data from Connecticut suggested that the NY DFS regu-
lations produced a reduction in 2.24 observed breaches in the post-treatment period. If we
extend this out across the 12 post-treatment months, this totals 26.88 incidents. Given this
incident count, we can use industry cost estimates and apply simplified formulas to approx-
imate the total regulatory savings. To this end, I leverage data from the 2020 Cyentia study
and the 2017 Ponemon study. While the Cyentia study is better designed to assess cost
estimates for a range of potential breach sizes, the Ponemon study leverages data closer to
the appropriate year and distinguishes between direct and indirect costs. Applying differ-
ent methodologies drawing on these data sources, we get a range of estimates of potential
savings. These calculations start with a loss table copied from the Cyentia report shown in
Table 6.4.
This loss table can be modified to estimate the percentage of incidents expected at each
loss value by subtracting each column by the preceding one (Table 6.5). The first column
can be subtracted from 100% to define some percentage of incidents as costing less than
$10K, a continuation of the exponential sequence, would assign $1000 for these incidents.
Given a distribution of incident magnitude and a total number of incidents, we could use
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Table 6.4: Probable losses based on records affected in a breach (Cyentia Report)
Probability of At Least This Much Loss








100 82.0% 49.9% 17.8% 3.3% 0.3% 0.0%
1K 88.4% 60.9% 26.0% 5.9% 0.7% 0.0%
10K 93.0% 71.1% 35.8% 10.0% 1.4% 0.1%
100K 96.0% 79.8% 46.7% 15.8% 2.7% 0.2%
1M 97.9% 86.7% 57.7% 23.5% 5.0% 0.5%
10M 99.0% 91.8% 68.2% 32.8% 8.6% 1.1%
100M 99.5% 95.3% 77.4% 43.4% 13.9% 2.3%
1B 99.8% 97.4% 84.9% 54.5% 21.0% 4.2%
10B 99.9% 98.7% 90.5% 65.3% 30.0% 7.4%
this loss table to approximate the total cost from a sample of incidents.
Table 6.5: Modified Loss Table Using Cyentia Data
Probability of At Least This Much Loss








100 18.00 % 32.10 % 32.10 % 14.50 % 3.00 % 0.30 % 0.00 %
1K 11.60 % 27.50 % 34.90 % 20.10 % 5.20 % 0.70 % 0.00 %
10K 7.00 % 21.90 % 35.30 % 25.80 % 8.60 % 1.30 % 0.10 %
100K 4.00 % 16.20 % 33.10 % 30.90 % 13.10 % 2.50 % 0.20 %
1M 2.10 % 11.20 % 29.00 % 34.20 % 18.50 % 4.50 % 0.50 %
10M 1.00 % 7.20 % 23.60 % 35.40 % 24.20 % 7.50 % 1.10 %
100M 0.50 % 4.20 % 17.90 % 34.00 % 29.50 % 11.60 % 2.30 %
1B 0.20 % 2.40 % 12.50 % 30.40 % 33.50 % 16.80 % 4.20 %
10B 0.10 % 1.20 % 8.20 % 25.20 % 35.30 % 22.60 % 7.40 %
The distribution of incident size can be approximated for the financial sector, using the
150 financial breach incidents reported to Maine in 2020.1 The total number of incidents
would, as discussed above, be 26.88 avoided incidents over a year. We can then multiply
this total number (26.88) by the percentages assigned to each magnitude (22.0% between
100-1k, 38.6% between 1k-10k, 18.6% between 10k-100k, 4.0% between 100k-1M, 1.3%
between 1M-10M, 0.6% between 10M-100M) to calculate the approximate number of in-
cidents for each magnitude.2 The loss levels can then be multiplied by the incident fre-
1Unlike Connecticut, the state of Maine reports total affected in addition to state residents affected
2Financial incidents larger than 100 million total affected (i.e., globally) were not reported to Maine in
2020.
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quency for each breach size (sometimes a fraction of an incident) to estimate the number
of incidents at each minimum loss level. These frequencies can then be multiplied by the
corresponding minimum amount lost to create an expected cost for each pairing of breach
size and loss level, as shown in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Estimated Cost for Different Categories
$1K $10K $100K $1M $10M $100M Total
100 $686 $16,262 $206,385 $1,188,634 $3,075,072 $4,139,520 $8,626,559
1k $726 $22,723 $366,262 $2,676,925 $8,923,085 $13,488,384 $25,478,105
10k $200 $8,099 $165,489 $1,544,901 $6,549,581 $12,499,200 $20,767,471
100k $23 $1,204 $31,181 $367,718 $1,989,120 $4,838,400 $7,227,646
1M $3 $252 $8,247 $123,702 $845,645 $2,620,800 $3,598,648
10M $3 $288 $12,256 $232,805 $2,019,924 $7,942,752 $2,404,415
Total $1,639 $48,608 $780,450 $5,956,716 $21,858,278 $39,457,152 $68,102,843
Taking the summation of this table provides an estimate for the saving from the NY
DFS regulations in the year after the implementation period as 68.10 Million dollars. This
estimate is a product of a summation of probabilities. Notably, more than half of this total
estimate comes from breaches costing 100+ million. However, the model estimated less
than one incident (0.41) of the expected 26.88 would have that loss amount. The magnitude
of losses is consequently highly dependent on a single high-cost incident being avoided.
Nevertheless, the methodology of estimation proscribed above would be conservative
in its estimation. For one, incident frequencies were multiplied by minimum losses. Breach
trends are often non-linear; for example, it is likely that the average cost of breaches be-
tween one and ten million will be closer to one million, but we would still expect the
average cost to be greater than this minimum. Secondly, incidents smaller than 100 were
excluded from the sample because Cyentia’s loss table lacked a corresponding distribution.
However, based on the Maine distribution, smaller incidents were only expected to ac-
count for 17 of the 141 incidents. If we assumed the same distribution of costs for smaller
incidents as with those affecting 100-1000, these incidents would add approximately 2.5
million to the estimated 68.1 million for a total of 70.6 million. Further, the observed
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breaches from Maine did not include larger incidents, which, as demonstrated in Cyentia’s
loss estimates, are much more likely to result in severe losses. It is possible that the size
distribution of incidents that affected Maine are not generalizable; there are good reasons
to believe they could either understate or overstate the average total breach size. Data from
Connecticut could not be used as they only collect the number of state residents affected.
The work of Cyentia highlights how the data reported by the Ponemon studies are fre-
quently misapplied to create inaccurate estimates of the overall costs of breaches. Conse-
quently, a simple application of Ponemon’s average cost record using the distribution of
breach sizes from Maine would skew the average incident to unrealistic proportions (213k
on average) and produce unrealistic estimates. However, as the Cyentia report notes, the
Ponemon study is derived using data in the range of 10-100 thousand affected users. Lim-
iting the Maine data to just this subset suggests an average incident size of 33,353 users per
record. However, this incident type accounts for only 18.6% of the data.
Cyentia itself claims to include indirect costs such as competitive advantage and rep-
utation, however, notes that these attributes might be less systematically accounted for in
their estimate. In a discussion of their cost estimates, Cyentia described the role of Loss
Magnitude in the Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) framework.
“FAIRTM breaks that down further by bucketing losses into six forms: produc-
tivity, response, replacement, competitive advantage, fines and judgments, and
reputation. Advisen tracks similar categories of losses, but we do not differen-
tiate among them in this study. Some of these are probably better represented
by our data (e.g., fines and judgments) than others (e.g., productivity and rep-
utation).”
In contrast, the Ponemon study provides breakdowns of direct and indirect costs. In
2017, they estimated that 64% of total costs for US breaches were a result of indirect
expenses (like customer loss and reputation). Ponemon clarifies that direct costs would
include activities likes the hiring of forensic experts or a law firm for assistance and offering
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victims identity protection services. We can consequently identify how Cyentia’s estimates
fall between the direct costs and the indirect costs reported by Ponemon, and may use
Ponemon’s estimates to approximate a range of potential cost estimates. This approach
assumes that the proportion of costs associated with incidents affecting 10-100k would
continue across the size distribution. Based on this lower and upper bound, the Ponemon
costs range from 78.4% to 223.2% of the Cyentia estimates. A more accurate estimate
of the Cyentia figures might also employ a 200% multiplier that would approximate the
average cost rather than a minimum (i.e., the average cost for incidents costing more than
one million and less than ten million could easily average two million. These estimates are
shown in Figure 6.3.
While many indirect costs are internalized by the business, for example, customer loss
and brand damage, these would not be socially felt in a competitive marketplace. Conse-
quently, the additional $149 of indirect expenses estimated by Ponemon may significantly
exaggerate the social cost. However, there are certainly other social factors, relating to soci-
etal trust and consumer privacy, that would be additive to these direct costs. A cost-benefit
analysis could attempt to identify the value of these societal costs. Overall, an estimate of
approximately 100 million dollars in direct costs saved from the regulation can serve as a
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conservative estimation of the benefits of the intervention using only the change in inci-
dents (where the submitter identified an industry) reported in the state of Connecticut. As
for the costs, how compliance costs are passed onto consumers, and whether there are net
social benefits from these changes is a question for future research.
6.4 Persistence of NY DFS Regulatory Effects
Given the savings observed from one year, we might ask for how long this trend of im-
proved performance by the state of New York could continue. Temporarily, data challenges
with New York and Connecticut records prevent us from drawing more direct conclusions.
In the first case, the requisite information is not coded, in the second, the information
from the open records request I filed ends in October 2019. However, data collected by
Maine suggests that the observed gap between financial incidents nationally and those in
New York would tighten in 2019 and 2020. Evidence for this breach growth is shown in
Figure 6.4.
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This increase is demonstrated by the .25 New York financial incidents observed per
month in 2018, doubling to .5 in 2019, and based on the first nine months of 2020, more
than doubling again to 1.22 incidents. In contrast, the growth rate was slower for other
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reported breaches from 5.25 per month in 2018, 5.91 in 2019, and 6.66 in 2020. This
suggests a potential tightening in the level difference between New York and the rest of the
country. Additional data from Connecticut, or New York may confirm this finding once
processed and collected. Assuming the change in breach performance is not a statistical
anomaly, this may imply the benefits from regulation are temporary. A temporary effect
could be explained by the wider industry catching up to a new standard of best practices.
Alternatively, the regulations might be effective by directing organizational attention to the
problem that might wane over time. A third potential hypothesis might look for the delayed
impact of additional regulations that the NY DFS implemented the following year.
6.5 Integrating Findings
This chapter has sought to explore the implications of the NY DFS regulatory reduction in
breaches. Why was this case demonstratively effective while others were not? Is this effect
significant? To address these questions, the four case studies have been comparatively
evaluated, the degree of expected breach reduction from the NY DFS regulations has been
assessed in dollars, and the persistence of this effect was explored. Compared to the other
three regulatory interventions, the NY DFS regulations were more targeted in their scope
(i.e., just the NY financial and insurance market), more extensive in the content of their
regulatory requirements, provided an intermediate length of time for implementation, and
employed a novel tiered maximum penalty formula. These actions all seem consistent with
the capacity of the NY DFS agency to learn from prior regulatory actions, both internal and
external.
The magnitude of the direct breach costs avoided by the NY DFS regulations is es-
timated in section 6.3 as approximately 100 million dollars. This number drew on the
change in the pre to the post-intervention difference between treatment and control for the
Connecticut quasi-experiments. This robustness check presented the strongest statistical
evidence, but I reduced estimation in the size of the effect. Additional costs could easily
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accrue if additional New York breaches were not registered in Connecticut but still avoided
or if we measured indirect societal benefits. Whether these savings are worth the costs for
regulatory compliance is an important question. Regardless, conservative estimates for sav-
ings in the hundreds of millions of dollars are sufficiently large to invoke attention. Many
of the compliance costs would likely be front-loaded, a cost-benefit assessment of the reg-
ulations will be highly dependent on the persistence of benefits. A preliminary analysis of
more recent data from Maine, suggests that this effect may not be enduring.
6.6 Future Research
New cybersecurity, data security, and privacy legislation have started to proliferate, par-
ticularly in response to the implementation of the European Union’s General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR). Yet, as new data becomes available and experiments present
themselves, an empirical and policy-focused community that can evaluate these changes is
still needed. Future comparative cybersecurity research leveraging this kind of analysis is
likely to grow in its usefulness. Global trends in data collection and an increasingly large
legal compliance regime means that even if US reporting requirements remain defederal-
ized, a large and engaged non-academic audience (both legal and technical) exists who will
hopefully be interested in this and future research findings. Yet, a window exists for ex-
perimentation before national norms are proposed, increasingly the business community is
frustrated with the complexity of compliance requirements both in the United States and
around the globe. If national model legislation is to be developed, rich empirical findings
should supplement subjective expert opinion.
Consequently, this work has aimed for generativity, by creating a method for the restruc-
turing of irregularly published state data. New research can build on this shared resource.
While the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse remains a popular data source for analysis, it lacks
important metadata and state-level dummy variables. Private sector firms like Advisen Ltd
have built impressive data sources, however, access to these sources is understandably lim-
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ited. Bringing some of this information into the public domain will hopefully assist the
policy community.
So what kind of questions might be asked that could build on this research? Critically,
this research only evaluated four cases. Future research will want to explore other reg-
ulatory interventions including privacy legislation, new data security legislation, changes
to data breach reporting requirements, and other state-level laws. Further, this research
should inform researchers globally to look at the effects of national and provincial legisla-
tion elsewhere. GDPR presents a particularly promising comparative data source. Further,
this research may start to attempt to connect its findings with other data sources. Much
cyber activity is not necessarily captured in these findings. For example, what is the role
of vulnerabilities in tracking with increased data breach activity? Has the rise or fall of
alternative hacking activities like ransomware or DDoS techniques reduced the likelihood
of breaches? Perhaps these techniques which may not require breach reporting, provide an
alternative source of revenue for hackers. I’m particularly interested in seeing if the 2016
plateau in reported breaches may be attributed to the rise of ransomware. Additional data
is also present downstream of breaches, how can these findings be integrated with reports
of cybercrime to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at ic3.gov or reports of identity
theft to the FTC.
Beyond macro empirical findings, there is a lot that can be done to start identifying
important micro firm-level information. What are the costs for compliance with these reg-
ulations in an average firm? How sensitive are firms to these regulatory changes? How do
CISO’s leverage regulatory interventions to justify new security investments? This micro-
level insight might be particularly useful at parsing whether new security investments de-
crease the frequency of incidents or do these new investments lead to the discovery of more
incidents. If both, how can we better understand this moving variable?
The cybersecurity domain is constantly evolving as hackers and information security
professionals adapt reflexively. This historical evolution presents ongoing challenges with
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claims of the generalizability of cybersecurity regulations the further we get from the initial
observed effect. Quasi-experiments may help to identify those interventions with signif-
icant effect, but an ongoing need for future research will be to identify the mechanism
involved. This is critically important to understanding how generalizable these findings are
to other sectors, states, or nations. Cory Doctorow, quoting his friend Katherine Myronuk,
says “All complex ecosystems have parasites” (Doctorow 2014). The cyber domain will
continue to evolve and be subject to criminality, yet sensible policy might just create barri-
ers to this criminality that can increase Internet user’s confidence and trust in the network.
Most importantly, there is immediate policy relevance to this research. This work
speaks to the broader efficacy of regulatory incentives in the cybersecurity domain. In-
creasingly, as the technology sector has grown and become more concentrated, the public
demands for regulatory oversight have grown as well. This research shows demonstrable
evidence that some, but not all, information security mandates can decrease breach report-
ing. This presents preliminary evidence for further expansion of interventions like the NY
DFS regulations. This has already begun to occur at the state-level in 2019, Connecticut
passed cybersecurity regulations for their Insurance sector modeled on the NY DFS regu-
lations scheduled to take effect on October 1, 2020. The mixed experience of regulatory
efforts should suggest some caution before the United States moves towards a national
standard, but should also increase state-level experimentation when it can be paired with
quality data collection. To this end, the cybersecurity domain should normalize policy eval-
uation as part of a broader move towards sector maturity. As Charles Babbage said, “errors





A.1 Relevant Data Security Legislation
Table A.1 was created using data from the National Conference of State Legislatures, which
has monitored and tracked Security Breach Legislation since 2010.
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Table A.1: Security Breach Notification Laws Passed in States by Year
State 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0
Arkansas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
California 0 1 0 0 3 2 1 0 1 1 0
Colorado 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Connecticut 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
District of Columbia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Florida 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 1 0
Georgia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hawaii 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Idaho 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Illinois 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2
Iowa 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
Kansas 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0
Maine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Maryland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 0
Massachusetts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
Minnesota 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mississippi 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Montana 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Nevada 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Hampshire 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0
New Jersey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
New Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
New York 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
North Carolina 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
North Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0
Ohio 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Oklahoma 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oregon 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
South Carolina 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
South Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
Texas 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Utah 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
Vermont 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0
Washington 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 2
West Virginia 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0




B.1 Comparative Interrupted Time Series
To produce the comparative ITS analysis described in chapter 4, I developed a novel R
code based on the work of Caswell (2018), who produced a SAS macro for the same func-
tion. This code and the output it produced are included here. Table B.1 shows a sample
data frame used for the segmented OLS regression. The rate information is pulled from the
Massachusetts Data Security case.
Listing B.1: Code Used to Produce Comparative ITS
q u a s i e x p <− e x p e r i m e n t [ e x p e r i m e n t $ t y p e != ” t e s t ” , ]
# Added dummy v a r i a b l e s f o r ITS
t r e a t m e n t <− as . d a t a . f rame ( t ( r b i n d ( quas i exp$yea rmon th ,
q u a s i e x p $ f r e q u e n c y . x ) ) )
t r e a t m e n t <− t r e a t m e n t %>%
mu ta t e ( Ti = as . v e c t o r ( 1 : nrow ( t r e a t m e n t ) ) ) %>%
mu ta t e (X = c ( r e p ( 0 , month n ) , r e p ( 1 , month n ) ) ) %>%
mu ta t e ( TiX = c ( r e p ( 0 , month n ) , 1 : ( nrow ( t r e a t m e n t ) − month n ) ) ) %>%
mu ta t e ( Z = c ( r e p ( 1 , month n ) , r e p ( 1 , month n ) ) ) %>%
mu ta t e ( ZTi = Z * Ti ) %>%
mu ta t e (ZX = Z * X) %>%
mu ta t e ( ZTiX = c ( r e p ( 0 , month n ) , 1 : ( nrow ( t r e a t m e n t ) − month n ) ) )
c o n t r o l <− as . d a t a . f rame ( t ( r b i n d ( quas i exp$yea rmon th ,
q u a s i e x p $ f r e q u e n c y . y ) ) )
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c o n t r o l <− c o n t r o l %>%
mu ta t e ( Ti = as . v e c t o r ( 1 : nrow ( c o n t r o l ) ) ) %>%
mu ta t e (X = c ( r e p ( 0 , month n ) , r e p ( 1 , month n ) ) ) %>%
mu ta t e ( TiX = c ( r e p ( 0 , month n ) , 1 : ( nrow ( c o n t r o l ) − month n ) ) ) %>%
mu ta t e ( Z = c ( r e p ( 0 , month n ) , r e p ( 0 , month n ) ) ) %>%
mu ta t e ( ZTi = Z * Ti ) %>%
mu ta t e (ZX = Z * X) %>%
mu ta t e ( ZTiX = Z * Ti * X)
AppendITS <− r b i n d ( t r e a t m e n t , c o n t r o l )
AppendITS [ 2 : n c o l ( AppendITS ) ] <− l a p p l y ( AppendITS [ 2 : n c o l ( AppendITS ) ] ,
a s . numer ic )
names ( AppendITS ) <− c ( ” yearmonth ” , ” i n c i d e n t p e r m i l ” , ” Ti ” , ”X” ,
”TiX ” , ” Z ” , ” ZTi ” , ”ZX” , ” ZTiX ” )
r e g T e s t <− lm ( i n c i d e n t p e r m i l ˜ Ti + X + TiX + Z + ZTi + ZX +
ZTiX , AppendITS )
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Table B.1: Sample Data Frame Used for Comparative ITS
Description Rate T X TX Z ZT ZX ZTX
Treatment, Pre-Test Month 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Treatment, Pre-Test Month 2 2 0 0 1 2 0 0
Treatment, Pre-Test Month 3 3 0 0 1 3 0 0
Treatment, Pre-Test Month 4 4 0 0 1 4 0 0
Treatment, Pre-Test Month 5 5 0 0 1 5 0 0
Treatment, Pre-Test Month 6 6 0 0 1 6 0 0
Treatment, Pre-Test Month 7 7 0 0 1 7 0 0
Treatment, Pre-Test Month 8 8 0 0 1 8 0 0
Treatment, Post-Test Month 1 9 1 1 1 9 1 1
Treatment, Post-Test Month 2 10 1 2 1 10 1 2
Treatment, Post-Test Month 3 11 1 3 1 11 1 3
Treatment, Post-Test Month 4 12 1 4 1 12 1 4
Treatment, Post-Test Month 5 13 1 5 1 13 1 5
Treatment, Post-Test Month 6 14 1 6 1 14 1 6
Treatment, Post-Test Month 7 15 1 7 1 15 1 7
Treatment, Post-Test Month 8 16 1 8 1 16 1 8
Control, Pre-Test Month 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Control, Pre-Test Month 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Control, Pre-Test Month 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Control, Pre-Test Month 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Control, Pre-Test Month 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Control, Pre-Test Month 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0
Control, Pre-Test Month 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0
Control, Pre-Test Month 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Control, Post-Test Month 1 9 1 1 0 0 0 0
Control, Post-Test Month 2 10 1 2 0 0 0 0
Control, Post-Test Month 3 11 1 3 0 0 0 0
Control, Post-Test Month 4 12 1 4 0 0 0 0
Control, Post-Test Month 5 13 1 5 0 0 0 0
Control, Post-Test Month 6 14 1 6 0 0 0 0
Control, Post-Test Month 7 15 1 7 0 0 0 0




C.1 Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation
One serious issue with time series analysis is the presence of autocorrelation and partial
autocorrelation. Autocorrelation indicates when the level of one observation is dependent
on the observation of another point in time. The following plots labeled as (a) were cre-
ated with the R function ACF to show the level of autocorrelation at different lags for the
specified time series. Those plots labeled (b) show the partial autocorrelation, created with
the R function PACF, which shows the relationship of an observation to a prior term in the
time series after removing the relationships of prior intervening observations.
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(a) (b)
Figure C.1: Tests on Massachusetts (No Resident Limit) for (a) ACF (b) PACF
(a) (b)
Figure C.2: Tests on Massachusetts (1000+ affected) for (a) ACF (b) PACF
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(a) (b)
Figure C.3: Tests on New Hampshire Incidents for (a) ACF (b) PACF
(a) (b)
Figure C.4: Tests on North Carolina (1000+ affected) for (a) ACF (b) PACF
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(a) (b)
Figure C.5: Tests on Health Related Incidents for (a) ACF (b) PACF
(a) (b)
Figure C.6: Tests on Non-Health Related Incidents for (a) ACF (b) PACF
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(a) (b)
Figure C.7: Tests on Finance Related Incidents as part of HITECH Act for (a) ACF (b)
PACF
(a) (b)
Figure C.8: Tests on All Incidents Across Six States (Used in Wyndham Case - July 2011
to November 2012) for (a) ACF (b) PACF
122
(a) (b)
Figure C.9: Tests on All Incidents Across Six States (Used in Wyndham Case - Oct 2014
to June 2016) for (a) ACF (b) PACF
(a) (b)
Figure C.10: Tests on Finance Incidents in New York for (a) ACF (b) PACF
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(a) (b)
Figure C.11: Tests on Finance Incidents Outside of New York for (a) ACF (b) PACF
(a) (b)
Figure C.12: Tests on All Non-Finance Incidents in New York for (a) ACF (b) PACF
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APPENDIX D
AVAILABILITY OF CODE AND DATA
All relevant project code and data files have been uploaded to GitHub were they are acces-
sible to researchers at: https://github.com/kgrindal/Dissertation Code. The files uploaded
to the GitHub repository are structured as an R Studio project, which can be downloaded
in its entirety (over 200 MB). Where possible, file referencing was made easier by employ-
ing the here package which allows for easy referencing within the existing file structure
(Müller and Bryan 2020). The project is structured around three folders: Data, Output,
and Scripts. The data folder contains relevant tabular data stored as .csv, .txt, .xlsx files.
The output folder is used as a destination folder to export output files. The Scripts folder
contains R and R Markdown (.Rmd) files that contain the bulk of the analytical work. To
give context to the function of this coding work, Table D.1 references a subset of available
files and their intended function.
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Table D.1: Function of code used in dissertation research
File Names Function
AllSource BreachData.Rmd
Merges state data with breach metadata associated
with HHS and Clearinghouse
Breach Laws.Rmd Analysis of data breach laws and bills
Cleaning RawBreachData.Rmd
Primary document for cleaning and integrating
state data breach reports
Descriptive State Breaches.Rmd
Identified the frequency of data breaches for
each state and decomposes breach data to find
seasonal patterns
Descriptive Stats.Rmd
Script for identifying the overall distribution of
data breach total size (i.e., number affected)
FTC CaseStudy.Rmd
Identify FTC data breach cases within state
breach reports
FTC Wyndham.Rmd
Analysis of FTC Wyndham case using segmented
regression of a comparative interrupted time series
HITECH Act.Rmd
Analysis of HITECH Act case using segmented
regression of a comparative interrupted time series
Mass Law.Rmd
Analysis of the Massachusetts Data Security Law
case using segmented regression of a comparative
interrupted time series
NewYorkFS.Rmd
Analysis of the NY DFS cybersecurity regulation
case using segmented regression of a comparative
interrupted time series
Ny Descriptive.Rmd
Assess distribution of breach incidents reported in
Maine
State Pop.Rmd
Imputing monthly population data for US states
using US Census records
126
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Federal Register. 2002. “16 CFR Part 314 Standards for Safeguarding Customer Informa-
tion; Final Rule ”67, no. 100 (May 23, 2002): 36484–36494. Accessed February 10,
2020. https : / / www. ftc . gov / sites / default / files / documents / federal register notices /
standards-safeguarding-customer-information-16-cfr-part-314/020523standardsforsafeguardingcustomerinformation.
pdf.
201 CMR 17.00: Standards for the Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the
Commonwealth. 2020. Accessed February 10, 2020. https://www.mass.gov/doc/201-
cmr - 17 - standards - for - the - protection - of - personal - information - of - residents - of -
the/download.
2019. “2018 Security Breach Legislation.” National Conference of State Legislatures, Febru-
ary 8, 2019. Accessed April 27, 2021. https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-
and-information-technology/2018-security-breach-legislation.aspx.
Federal Register. 2009. “45 CFR Parts 160 and 164 Breach Notification for Unsecured
Protected Health Informati ”74, no. 162 (August 24, 2009): 42740–42770. Accessed
July 14, 2021. https : / / www. govinfo . gov / content / pkg / FR - 2009 - 08 - 24 / pdf / E9 -
20169.pdf.
. 2003. “45 CFR Parts 160, 162, and 164 Health Insurance Reform: Security Stan-
dards; Final Rule ”68, no. 34 (February 20, 2003): 8334–8381. Accessed April 27,
2021. https : / / www. hhs . gov / sites / default / files / ocr / privacy / hipaa / administrative /
securityrule/securityrulepdf.pdf?language=es.
A Budget for A Better America, Fiscal Year 2020. 2020, 305–310. Analytical Perspectives.
Washington D.C. Accessed February 10, 2020. https : / / www. whitehouse . gov / wp -
content/uploads/2019/03/spec-fy2020.pdf.
Actions by Attorney General; Notice; Venue; Injunctions. 2020. Accessed February 10,
2020. https : / / malegislature . gov / Laws / GeneralLaws / PartI / TitleXV / Chapter93A /
Section4.
Agranoff, Robert, and Beryl A. Radin. 1991. “The Comparative Case Study Approach in
Public Administration.” Edited by James L Perry. In Research in Public Administration:
A Research Annual. 203–231. Vol. 1. N.p.: JAI Press, Inc.
An Act Relative to Consumer Protection from Security Breaches. 2018 H.4806. July 24,
2018. Accessed February 10, 2020. https://malegislature.gov/Bills/190/H4806.
An Act Relative to Security Freezes and Notification of Data Breaches. 2007. August 2,
2007. https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2007/Chapter82.
An Act to Amend, Renumber, and Add Section 1798.82 of, and to Add Section 1798.29 to,
the Civil Code, Relating to Personal Information. 2002. September 25, 2002.
127
An Act to Enhance Protections Against Identity Theft and to Protect the Credit of Crime Vic-
tims Compensation Fund Applications and Appeals. 2021 Senate Bill 1017. Accessed
March 3, 2021. https://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2009/Bills/Senate/PDF/S1017v7.pdf.
Anderson, R., and T. Moore. 2006. “The Economics of Information Security.” Science
314, no. 5799 (October 27, 2006): 610–613. Accessed April 12, 2020. https://www.
sciencemag.org/lookup/doi/10.1126/science.1130992. 10.1126/science.1130992.
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